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SOLVING JURISDICTION’S SOCIAL COST 
Dustin E. Buehler* 
Abstract: Federal court subject-matter jurisdiction rules incur a significant social cost—
when jurisdiction is found lacking, courts must dismiss, no matter how many years and 
resources the parties have spent on the case. Indeed, hundreds of belated jurisdictional 
dismissals occur each year after parties have already engaged in discovery, dispositive 
motions, or even trial. 
Federal judges tolerate this waste largely because they view nonwaivable jurisdictional 
rules as a function of structural values rooted in the Constitution, rather than efficiency 
concerns. In contrast, scholars tend to focus primarily on efficiency arguments while 
discussing jurisdictional nonwaivability, de-emphasizing important structural interests. Both 
theories are overly monistic and fail to consider the full range of jurisdictional values. 
This Article advances two claims. First, jurisdictional values are pluralistic and 
multipolar, implicating structural and efficiency interests that are fundamentally 
incommensurable. We should not simply attempt to maximize a single set of jurisdictional 
values. And because there is no single unit of measurement for weighing structural values 
such as “separation of powers” against efficiency interests such as “litigation waste,” we 
should resist forcing these interests through a cost-benefit analysis. Instead, courts and rule 
makers should seek equilibrium among all relevant values when fashioning jurisdictional 
rules. 
Second, using this equilibration approach, the Article proposes a solution to jurisdiction’s 
social cost: Courts should resolve all subject-matter jurisdiction questions at the outset of 
litigation. Federal district courts should affirmatively certify the existence of jurisdiction in 
every case; after that point, objections to statutory federal jurisdiction would be waived. 
Moreover, to accommodate both structural and efficiency interests, appellate courts should 
have discretion to immediately review jurisdictional orders when the benefits of doing so 
outweigh the costs. Lastly, federal courts should use the threat of sanctions to deter private-
party abuse of jurisdictional rules. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, the Supreme Court has reminded us that federal court 
subject-matter jurisdiction is both inflexible and unforgiving.1 It has 
stressed that the parties cannot consent to or waive jurisdictional 
requirements,2 and that federal courts have an obligation to raise 
1. True to form, the procedurally active Roberts Court issued sixteen opinions on jurisdictional 
issues during the October 2012 Term—about twenty percent of the Court’s docket. 
2. See Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Knowles, __ U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 1345, 1350–51 (2013) (holding 
that a nonbinding stipulation regarding the amount in controversy does not negate federal 
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jurisdictional defects, on their own initiative if necessary.3 The Court 
also has emphasized that litigants can raise jurisdictional defects at any 
time, even for the first time on appeal.4 And once again, we have 
witnessed the harsh effect of latent jurisdictional defects: The court must 
dismiss the suit, forcing the parties to start over, no matter how many 
years and resources they have spent on litigation up to that point.5 
The social waste generated by jurisdictional nonwaivability6 is real 
and alarming. Federal courts conduct a belated jurisdictional inquiry in 
approximately five hundred cases each year,7 analyzing subject-matter 
jurisdiction for the first time months or years after the close of the 
pleadings,8 and sometimes only after the case is on appeal.9 Courts 
dismiss about forty percent of these cases, wasting resources the parties 
have already spent on discovery, dispositive motions, and sometimes 
even on trial.10 Given the exorbitant cost of modern litigation—it is not 
jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act). 
3. See Hollingsworth v. Perry, __ U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2659 (2013) (describing jurisdiction 
as “an essential limit on our power”); Gonzalez v. Thaler, __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 641, 648 (2012) 
(noting that courts must consider jurisdiction sua sponte). 
4. Sebelius v. Auburn Reg’l Med. Ctr., __ U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 817, 824 (2013). 
5. E.g., Lozman v. City of Rivera Beach, __ U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 735, 739–40, 746 (2013) 
(holding jurisdiction did not exist, despite years of litigation and a trial on the merits); see also 
Sebelius, 133 S. Ct. at 824 (noting that “[t]ardy jurisdictional objections . . . can therefore result in a 
waste of adjudicatory resources”). 
6. This Article uses the phrase “jurisdictional nonwaivability” to refer to the characteristics that 
make federal court subject-matter jurisdiction exceptional: the inability of parties to consent to or 
waive it, the obligation of courts to raise jurisdictional issues sua sponte, and the ability of litigants 
or courts to invoke jurisdictional defects at any stage of litigation. 
7. A comprehensive review of all federal district court opinions on Westlaw issued during June 
2013 and containing the phrase “subject matter jurisdiction” yielded forty-six opinions with belated 
jurisdictional analysis. Assuming June 2013 is a representative sample month, this suggests that 
federal district courts belatedly analyze jurisdiction in more than 500 cases each year. 
8. E.g., Chambers v. Kan. City Kan. Cmty. Coll., No. 11-CV-2646-CM-DJW, 2013 WL 
3322315, at *2–3 (D. Kan. June 28, 2013) (dismissing claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction 
nearly two years after suit was filed), vacated on other grounds, 2014 WL 326021 (D. Kan. Jan. 29, 
2014); In re Motor Fuel Temperature Sales Practices Litig., MDL No. 1840, 2013 WL 3283859, at 
*1–3 (D. Kan. June 28, 2013) (analyzing jurisdiction six years after plaintiffs filed their class action, 
while deciding summary judgment motions). 
9. E.g., Builders Mut. Ins. Co. v. Dragas Mgmt., 497 F. App’x 313, 315–18 (4th Cir. 2012) 
(deciding jurisdictional issue raised for the first time on appeal). 
10. District courts dismissed eighteen of the forty-six belated jurisdictional analysis cases 
decided in June 2013, suggesting a dismissal rate of about 200 cases per year. See, e.g., Chambers, 
2013 WL 3322315, at *2–3 (dismissing claims for lack of jurisdiction nearly two years after suit 
was filed, while adjudicating a motion for summary judgment); Grill v. Quinn, No. 2:10-cv-0757 
GEB GGH PS, 2013 WL 3146803, at *1 (E.D. Cal. June 18, 2013) (dismissing for lack of 
jurisdiction despite “long and complex” proceedings because “recent events” disclosed plaintiff did 
not have standing for his claims). 
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unusual for litigants to spend hundreds of thousands of dollars on 
discovery and merits litigation11—the social cost of belated 
jurisdictional dismissals is intolerable. 
Federal courts tolerate this waste, however, largely because they view 
jurisdictional nonwaivability as a function of immutable structural 
values rooted in the Constitution. When judges dismiss cases on 
jurisdictional grounds, they reference federalism and separation-of-
powers interests,12 casting themselves as impartial enforcers of 
jurisdictional boundaries drawn by Congress.13 In doing so, they de-
emphasize non-structural considerations, such as efficiency and 
economic waste. Indeed, some courts have stated that these non-
structural considerations are entirely irrelevant to jurisdictional 
analysis.14 
Several scholars have criticized this overreliance on structural 
interests, basing their arguments primarily on efficiency values.15 They 
point to the significant social waste resulting from belated jurisdictional 
dismissals,16 as well as the tendency for litigants to strategically contest 
jurisdiction in ways that exacerbate this waste (i.e., when a party raises a 
jurisdictional defect for the first time after losing on the merits, in order 
to void the adverse judgment).17 While bringing much-needed attention 
11. See Scott A. Moss, Litigation Discovery Cannot Be Optimal but Could Be Better: The 
Economics of Improving Discovery Timing in the Digital Age, 58 DUKE L.J. 889, 894 (2009) 
(noting the cost of electronic discovery can amount to “tens or hundreds of thousands of dollars” in 
typical cases); Michael Orey, Fear of Firing: How the Threat of Litigation Is Making Companies 
Skittish About Axing Problem Workers, BUSINESSWEEK (Apr. 23, 2007), 
http://www.businessweek.com/stories/2007-04-22/fear-of-firing (noting that it costs $300,000 to 
defend a single employment discrimination case through trial). 
12. E.g., Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 585–87 (1999); Steel Co. v. Citizens 
for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 101 (1998); Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U.S. 200, 207 
(1993). 
13. See Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 366 F. Supp. 51, 
55 (D.D.C. 1973) (“When it comes to jurisdiction of the federal courts, truly, to paraphrase the 
scripture, the Congress giveth, and the Congress taketh away.”). 
14. E.g., Dow Jones & Co. v. Ablaise Ltd., 606 F.3d 1338, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Laughlin v. 
Kmart Corp., 50 F.3d 871, 874 (10th Cir. 1995); Prof’l Managers’ Ass’n v. United States, 761 F.2d 
740, 745 (D.C. Cir. 1985). 
15. E.g., Dan B. Dobbs, Beyond Bootstrap: Foreclosing the Issue of Subject-Matter Jurisdiction 
Before Final Judgment, 51 MINN. L. REV. 491, 491–92 (1966); Qian A. Gao, Note, “Salvage 
Operations Are Ordinarily Preferable to the Wrecking Ball”: Barring Challenges to Subject Matter 
Jurisdiction, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 2369, 2381 (2005). 
16. See, e.g., Bruce A. Wagman, Note, Second Bites at the Jurisdictional Apple: A Proposal for 
Preventing False Assertions of Diversity of Citizenship, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 1417, 1430–32 (1990); 
Eric Kades, The Law and Economics of Jurisdiction (William & Mary Law Sch. Research Paper 
No. 09-11, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1431959. 
17. Dobbs, supra note 15, at 492; Gao, supra note 15, at 2371. 
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to jurisdiction’s social cost, many of these scholars unfortunately have 
been either indifferent or overtly hostile to the important structural 
interests underlying nonwaivable jurisdictional rules.18 
In this respect, courts and commentators are talking past one another 
when it comes to federal jurisdiction. Remarkably, they increasingly 
resort to discordant, monistic theories of jurisdictional value, which fail 
to consider the full range of interests implicated by jurisdictional rules.19 
This is further complicated by the fact that the two sides are talking 
about values that are fundamentally incommensurable—there is no 
single unit of measurement that we can use to weigh structural values 
such as “separation of powers” against efficiency interests such as 
“litigation waste.”20 Indeed, perhaps the most surprising aspect of the 
debate on jurisdictional nonwaivability is that it is not a debate at all. 
I aim to provoke a real debate on jurisdictional nonwaivability by 
advancing two primary claims. First, I argue that jurisdictional values 
are inherently pluralistic and multipolar, and that courts and rule makers 
should seek equilibrium among values when making jurisdictional rules. 
In practice, nonwaivable jurisdictional rules are pluralistic because they 
implicate both structural and efficiency values—interests that are 
fundamentally incommensurable. Courts and rule makers should not 
simply attempt to maximize a single set of jurisdictional values, nor 
should they force incommensurable structural and efficiency interests 
through a cost-benefit analysis. Instead, they should take a full inventory 
of relevant interests, and formulate jurisdictional rules that achieve 
equilibrium among those values. 
Second, using an equilibration approach, I advance a proposal to 
solve jurisdiction’s social cost that accommodates structural and 
efficiency values: Federal courts should adjudicate and resolve all 
subject-matter jurisdiction questions at the outset of litigation. The rules 
should require district courts to affirmatively certify the existence of 
jurisdiction in every case; after that point, objections to statutory federal 
18. See AM. LAW INST., STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND 
FEDERAL COURTS 366 (1969) [hereinafter ALI STUDY] (labeling jurisdictional nonwaivability a 
“fetish”); Dobbs, supra note 15, at 525 (arguing that jurisdictional nonwaivability is “justifiable 
only on a radical view of ‘states’ rights’”). 
19. Monistic theories consider only one value or, more broadly construed, one homogeneous set 
of values. See Steven J. Burton, Normative Legal Theories: The Case for Pluralism and Balancing, 
98 IOWA L. REV. 535, 537 (2013). 
20. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 MICH. L. REV. 
779, 796 (1994) (“Incommensurability occurs when the relevant goods cannot be aligned along a 
single metric without doing violence to our considered judgments about how these goods are best 
characterized.”). 
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jurisdiction would be waived. To further accommodate structural and 
efficiency interests, appellate courts should have discretion to 
immediately review jurisdictional orders when the benefits of doing so 
outweigh the costs. Lastly, federal courts should use the threat of 
sanctions to deter private-party abuse of jurisdictional rules. 
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I outlines a pluralistic theory 
of jurisdiction. It examines the dueling monistic theories of jurisdictional 
value advanced by courts and commentators. Courts focus on structural 
interests; commentators emphasize efficiency concerns. Neither theory 
considers a full range of relevant values, and both mask the reality that 
jurisdictional values are inherently multipolar and incommensurable. I 
conclude that courts and rule makers should adopt an equilibration 
approach, adopting rules that achieve equilibrium among all relevant 
jurisdictional values. 
As part of an equilibration approach, Part II deconstructs the various 
structural and efficiency values underlying nonwaivable jurisdictional 
rules. Looking first at structural values, I emphasize that separation of 
powers and federalism are not as monolithic as they first appear; instead, 
federal courts can and must play a key role in asserting federal and 
judicial prerogatives in jurisdictional disputes. As for efficiency values, I 
attribute jurisdiction’s social cost to several perverse private-party 
incentives from nonwaivable jurisdictional rules—those rules induce 
plaintiffs to file jurisdictionally suspect lawsuits, motivate defendants to 
adopt a wait-and-see approach to jurisdictional litigation, and can even 
encourage plaintiffs to belatedly challenge jurisdiction. Worse yet, there 
are inadequate incentives for federal courts to ferret out jurisdictional 
defects early on in the litigation process. 
Finally, Part III outlines my proposal for solving jurisdiction’s social 
cost by achieving equilibrium among jurisdictional values. It first offers 
a critique of existing proposals to alter nonwaivable jurisdictional rules. 
It then outlines a series of changes that would accommodate both 
structural and efficiency values, including early jurisdictional rulings, a 
cut-off point for jurisdictional objections, interlocutory appeal of 
jurisdictional orders, and sanctions to deter abuse by litigants. 
I. A PLURALISTIC THEORY OF JURISDICTION 
This Part introduces the core values underlying jurisdictional 
nonwaivability, situating my argument within the existing case law and 
literature on federal court subject-matter jurisdiction. It shows that 
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defenders and critics of nonwaivable jurisdictional rules are largely 
talking past one another. Judges tend to frame jurisdiction as a structural 
right;21 many commentators focus primarily on the inefficiency of 
nonwaivable jurisdictional rules.22 I contend that this divergence reflects 
overly monistic theories of jurisdictional value, which ignore the 
pluralistic and incommensurable nature of jurisdictional interests.23 I 
conclude that courts and rule makers should aim for equilibrium among 
these pluralistic interests, rather than focusing on a single value set.24 
A. Structural Values 
Federal courts frame jurisdiction in terms of structural values. When 
adjudicating jurisdictional issues, they frequently reference federalism,25 
and “the avoidance of needless conflict between state and federal 
courts.”26 Courts also emphasize separation-of-powers concerns—
specifically, Congress’s constitutional power to define jurisdictional 
boundaries.27 
Judges invoke these structural values as primary justifications for 
jurisdictional nonwaivability.28 They cast their obligation to raise 
jurisdictional defects at any time as essential to “the nature and limits of 
the judicial power”29 and “the characterization of the federal 
sovereign.”30 And they insist that inflexible adherence to jurisdictional 
restrictions is necessary because jurisdiction is “an essential ingredient 
of separation and equilibration of powers.”31 
This rhetoric suggests that federal judges view jurisdictional 
nonwaivability as a function of structural rights, rather than individual 
21. See infra Part I.A. 
22. See infra Part I.B. 
23. See infra Part I.C. 
24. See infra Part I.D. 
25. See, e.g., Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 586–87 (1999); Cox Broad. 
Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 505 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Victory Carriers, Inc. v. Law, 
404 U.S. 202, 212 (1971).  
26. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657–58 (1961); see also Atl. Coast Line R.R. v. Bhd. of 
Locomotive Eng’rs, 398 U.S. 281, 286 (1970) (“Obviously this dual system could not function if 
state and federal courts were free to fight each other for control of a particular case.”). 
27. See, e.g., Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U.S. 200, 207 (1993). 
28. See, e.g., Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541 (1986). 
29. Ins. Corp. of Ir., Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982) 
(quoting Mansfield, C. & L. M. Ry. Co. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379, 382 (1884)). 
30. Ins. Corp. of Ir., 456 U.S. at 702. 
31. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 101 (1998). 
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rights.32 When a federal court disregards jurisdictional limits, it exercises 
power not authorized by the people’s elected representatives, and usurps 
state judicial authority over the case.33 Courts strictly enforce limitations 
on their own jurisdiction to guard against such intrusions, thus ensuring 
that they remain the “least dangerous branch.”34 
When viewed this way, the nonwaivability of jurisdictional rules 
makes sense. In contrast to waivable individual due process rights (such 
as objections to personal jurisdiction35 or the right to notice and a prior 
hearing36), subject-matter jurisdiction protects society at large from 
unconstitutional judicial overreach.37 Thus, in theory, jurisdictional 
limitations should not be waivable at the whim of individual litigants. 
Among the bench, this notion of jurisdiction-as-structural-right almost 
always trumps other considerations, such as efficiency or economic 
waste.38 Courts repeatedly emphasize that jurisdiction is a threshold 
requirement, and “no amount of ‘prudential reasons’ or perceived 
increases in efficiency” can justify adjudication when jurisdiction does 
not exist.39 Indeed, one judge has even stated the “notion of judicial 
efficiency . . . is essentially irrelevant” to jurisdictional analysis in the 
federal courts.40 
Admittedly, this sweeping rhetoric is somewhat misleading. 
Efficiency concerns are not irrelevant; instead, those interests seep into 
32. See, e.g., Stephen I. Vladeck, Deconstructing Hirota: Habeas Corpus, Citizenship, and 
Article III, 95 GEO. L.J. 1497, 1541–43 (2007) (arguing that federal court subject-matter jurisdiction 
is a structural right); see also Steven G. Gey, The Procedural Annihilation of Structural Rights, 61 
HASTINGS L.J. 1, 4–5 (2009) (noting that individual rights provide recourse against government 
conduct targeting individuals, while structural rights protect all citizens against government conduct 
threatening the structure of the democratic system). 
33. See 13 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: 
JURISDICTION AND RELATED MATTERS § 3522, at 100, 125–26 (3d ed. 2008). 
34. THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, at 485 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
35. Ins. Corp. of Ir., 456 U.S. at 702–03 (“Because the requirement of personal jurisdiction 
represents first of all an individual right, it can, like other such rights, be waived.”). 
36. E.g., D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 185 (1972). 
37. See Ins. Corp. of Ir., 456 U.S. at 701–02; see also Vladeck, supra note 32, at 1543–44. 
38. See, e.g., McBeth v. Himes, 598 F.3d 708, 722 (10th Cir. 2010) (rejecting “the notion that 
efficiency for the parties and the court can provide a reason to overlook a jurisdictional 
deficiency”). 
39. Dow Jones & Co. v. Ablaise Ltd., 606 F.3d 1338, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2010); see also Laughlin 
v. Kmart Corp., 50 F.3d 871, 874 (10th Cir. 1995). 
40. Funeral Consumers Alliance, Inc. v. Serv. Corp. Int’l, 695 F.3d 330, 353 (5th Cir. 2012) 
(Clement, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis added); see also Prof’l Managers’ 
Ass’n v. United States, 761 F.2d 740, 745 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (holding that federal courts lack the 
power to decide cases for which they have no jurisdiction, regardless of whether doing so would be 
efficient). 
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judicial opinions on jurisdictional issues from time to time.41 But, at the 
very least, federal court judges still feel the need to hide behind 
structural reasoning, if for no other reason than because they believe that 
it is the duty of Congress—not the courts—to weigh efficiency interests 
in the context of federal jurisdiction.42 
B. Efficiency Values 
In contrast to this emphasis on structural values by federal judges, 
many scholars reason from efficiency values and focus on the social cost 
of jurisdictional nonwaivability.43 In particular, commentators point to 
the litigation waste resulting from belated jurisdictional dismissals.44 
Because courts must dismiss cases lacking jurisdiction at any time (even 
for the first time on appeal), they sometimes dismiss actions on 
jurisdictional grounds after the parties have spent hundreds of thousands 
of dollars on discovery, motions practice, and perhaps even trial.45 
In addition to criticizing this waste, commentators argue that 
nonwaivability converts jurisdictional defects into strategic trump 
cards,46 resulting in needlessly duplicative litigation. Parties with 
41. See, e.g., Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 315 
(2005) (analyzing the effect that an exercise of jurisdiction will have on federal court caseloads, vis-
à-vis “the federal-state division of labor”); Caterpillar, Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 75 (1996) 
(referring to “considerations of finality, efficiency, and economy” in the context of diversity 
jurisdiction). 
42. For example, rather than authorizing the full scope of diversity jurisdiction allowable under 
Article III, Congress has limited diversity jurisdiction to cases in which there is complete diversity 
and a minimum amount in controversy. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2012). The effect is that federal 
district court dockets are more manageable than they otherwise would be under the full scope of 
Article III jurisdiction. 
43. E.g., Dobbs, supra note 15, at 492 (arguing that jurisdictional nonwaivability is 
“inefficient”); Gao, supra note 15, at 2381 (noting that jurisdictional nonwaivability “hinder[s] the 
goals of fairness and efficiency”). 
44. See, e.g., William Marshall, The “Facts” of Federal Subject Matter Jurisdiction, 35 
DEPAUL L. REV. 23, 26 (1985) (lamenting the “considerable expense, delay, and inconvenience to 
the parties” that results from belated jurisdictional dismissals); H.A. Stephens, Jr., Estoppel to Deny 
Federal Jurisdiction—Klee and Di Frischia Break Ground, 68 DICK. L. REV. 39, 40 (1963) 
(observing that nonwaivable jurisdictional rules incur an “incalculable waste of time, effort, energy, 
and money”); Wagman, supra note 16, at 1432 (arguing that “shifting cases to state courts after 
substantial progress has been made is costly and duplicative”); Kades, supra note 16, at 1 (noting 
that when a case is dismissed, “all of the resources expended by the parties and society in the 
adjudication are rendered worthless”). 
45. E.g., Builders Mut. Ins. Co. v. Dragas Mgmt., 497 F. App’x 313, 315–18 (4th Cir. 2012) 
(appellate court vacated summary judgment on jurisdictional grounds, after more than two years of 
litigation); Firstenberg v. City of Santa Fe, 696 F.3d 1018, 1020 (10th Cir. 2012) (appellate court 
noticed jurisdictional defect after the parties had already completed a full round of briefing). 
46. See, e.g., Dobbs, supra note 15, at 492; Gao, supra note 15, at 2371. 
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knowledge of a jurisdictional defect can remain silent, choosing to raise 
the defect only if they receive an unfavorable result on the merits, in 
order to wipe the slate clean.47 Nothing prevents a party who invoked 
jurisdiction at the outset of litigation from attacking jurisdiction after 
suffering an adverse decision on the merits.48 Thus, nonwaivable 
jurisdictional rules can incentivize strategically inefficient behavior. 
Of course, this focus on efficiency does not mean that scholars have 
ignored structural values. Commentators frequently point out that federal 
courts are courts of limited jurisdiction,49 and often refer in passing to 
the structural interests that animate nonwaivable jurisdictional rules.50 In 
particular, Michael Collins suggests that a focus on the efficiency of 
jurisdictional rules risks compromising essential structural values, and 
“seems calculated more toward guaranteeing a lack of care in the 
invocation of jurisdiction and in the courts’ consideration of it than 
toward the conservation of any significant resources.”51 
That said, much of the existing scholarship on jurisdictional 
nonwaivability is largely indifferent—if not overtly hostile—to 
structural values. Although a few scholars attempt to harmonize 
structural and efficiency values,52 others are not so kind. Dan Dobbs has 
argued that nonwaivable jurisdictional rules produce “egregiously bad 
results” that “no high-minded talk of states’ rights or limited judicial 
power can obscure.”53 And the American Law Institute has labeled 
jurisdictional nonwaivability a “fetish” that is “wholly inconsistent with 
sound judicial administration” and that “can only serve to diminish 
respect for a system that tolerates it.”54 
47. See, e.g., Dobbs, supra note 15, at 492; Gao, supra note 15, at 2371. 
48. See, e.g., Am. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 7–8, 16–18 (1951) (defendant removed 
the case from state court to federal court, lost at trial, then successfully argued that the federal court 
lacked jurisdiction); Capron v. Van Noorden, 6 U.S. 126, 126–27 (1804) (plaintiff invoked federal 
court diversity jurisdiction, lost at trial, then successfully raised a jurisdictional defect). 
49. See, e.g., Stephens, supra note 44, at 39; Gao, supra note 15, at 2372. 
50. See, e.g., Marshall, supra note 44, at 25; Kades, supra note 16, at 1. 
51. Michael G. Collins, Jurisdictional Exceptionalism, 93 VA. L. REV. 1829, 1895 (2007). 
52. See, e.g., id. at 1883 (suggesting that, at least historically, jurisdictional waivability appears 
to be compatible with constitutional and statutory limits on federal jurisdiction); Gao, supra note 15, 
at 2401–02 (insisting that her proposal for an early cut-off of jurisdictional challenges would not 
offend federalism concerns). 
53. Dobbs, supra note 15, at 524–25. Professor Dobbs does not pull punches. He argues that 
nonwaivable jurisdictional rules are “justifiable only on a radical view of ‘states’ rights’,” id. at 525, 
and are based on “a misconceived notion, surely inherited from the Middle Ages, that it would be 
insulting for federal courts to try cases ‘belonging’ to state courts.” Id. at 529. 
54. ALI STUDY, supra note 18, at 366; see also Dobbs, supra note 15, at 524. 
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C. Problems Presented by the Structural-Efficiency Dichotomy 
I argue that these divergent structural and efficiency rationales reflect 
overly monistic theories of jurisdictional value, which fail to consider 
the full range of interests implicated by jurisdictional rules.55 I also 
contend that the fractured dialogue among judges and commentators 
masks a significant obstacle for efforts to solve jurisdiction’s social cost: 
Many of the values underlying federal jurisdiction are fundamentally 
incommensurable, and cannot be weighed out through a cost-benefit 
analysis.56 
1. Value Monism 
Theories about law are either monistic or pluralistic. Monistic theories 
consider only one value or, more broadly construed, one homogeneous 
set of values.57 The aim is to avoid the need to balance conflicting 
interests.58 In contrast, pluralistic theories consider multiple competing 
interests.59 Although pluralism can take many specific forms,60 the 
overriding goal of a pluralistic approach is to balance several relevant 
values, rather than focusing on a single value set.61 
By homing in on a single set of values, defenders and critics of 
jurisdictional nonwaivability advance competing monistic theories of 
jurisdictional value.62 As demonstrated above, judges invoke structural 
interests when discussing nonwaivable jurisdictional rules, but usually 
refuse to consider efficiency values.63 Scholars focus on efficiency 
interests, often neglecting structural values.64 Thus, each group has a 
55. See infra Part I.C.1. 
56. See infra Part I.C.2. 
57. See Burton, supra note 19, at 537; Brett G. Scharffs, Adjudication and the Problems of 
Incommensurability, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1367, 1412 (2001) (observing that “monism is 
implicated any time an adjudicative choice is reduced to a single dimension”). 
58. Burton, supra note 19, at 537. For example, methods of constitutional interpretation such as 
formalism or originalism often rely on a single inquiry or value, to the exclusion of other 
considerations. Scharffs, supra note 57, at 1412–13. 
59. Burton, supra note 19, at 537. 
60. See id. at 544–45, 544 n.20 (distinguishing several varieties of pluralism). 
61. Id. at 537. For example, some scholars have advanced pluralistic methods for constitutional 
interpretation, which draw on multiple principles or sources. See, e.g., Stephen M. Griffen, 
Pluralism in Constitutional Interpretation, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1753, 1762–67 (1994). 
62. Neither side identifies its theories as monistic. Nonetheless, I contend that structural and 
efficiency theories of jurisdictional nonwaivability “have monistic ambitions,” even if “they are 
unspoken.” Scharffs, supra note 57, at 1413. 
63. See supra notes 25–42 and accompanying text. 
64. See supra notes 43–54 and accompanying text. 
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tendency to default to a single value set, at the exclusion of other 
relevant interests.65 
Monistic theories are problematic in this context for at least two 
reasons. First, jurisdictional values are plural, not singular. The 
application of nonwaivable jurisdictional rules implicates both structural 
and efficiency values. Neither litigants nor courts can ignore 
constitutional or statutory restrictions on subject-matter jurisdiction 
when it would be efficient to do so. And even if a belated jurisdictional 
dismissal accommodates structural values, it does not absolve the parties 
of their sunk litigation costs. Simply put, monistic theories do not reflect 
jurisdictional reality. 
Second, these monistic theories are problematic because they 
inevitably lead courts and commentators to seek maximization of a 
single value set, while ignoring other relevant considerations.66 In the 
context of jurisdictional rules, the implicit goal of both sides appears to 
be maximization. Courts maximize structural values by insisting on 
nonwaivability.67 Commentators maximize efficiency values by 
proposing jurisdictional cut-off points at an early stage of litigation.68 
Neither side is considering all relevant values. 
In a sense, existing monistic approaches to jurisdictional value are 
analogous to baking a cake with either dry ingredients or wet 
ingredients, but not both. Maximizing only one value set while ignoring 
the other ruins the cake. Likewise, monistic theories of jurisdictional 
value are undesirable because they fail to consider all interests 
implicated by nonwaivable jurisdictional rules. 
65. Although I cast each of the two relevant value sets (structural values and efficiency values) 
as monistic and homogenous, several sub-interests admittedly comprise each set of values, and 
those sub-interests may be in conflict at times. Within Article III structural values, for example, a 
specific jurisdictional rule may accommodate separation-of-powers concerns while still offending 
notions of federalism. I do not mean to suggest that structural and efficiency values are incapable of 
sub-categorization; instead, my point here is that judges and critics primarily resort to two 
different—and sometimes conflicting—value sets when discussing nonwaivable jurisdictional rules. 
66. See Scharffs, supra note 57, at 1412 (“Maximization is an almost necessary corollary of 
monism: if there is only one relevant value, then it is difficult to imagine a persuasive reason for 
choosing any option other than the one that will maximize the realizations of that value.”). 
67. See, e.g., Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541 (1986); Sosna v. Iowa, 
419 U.S. 393, 398 (1975). 
68. See, e.g., ALI STUDY, supra note 18, at 64 (proposing that parties be required to raise 
jurisdictional issues before “the commencement of trial on the merits” or, alternatively, before a 
“decision . . . that is dispositive of the merits”); Gao, supra note 15, at 2405 (proposing that 
jurisdictional challenges be foreclosed when “the initial pleadings, answers, and motions under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12 have been made”). 
 
                                                     
04 - Buehler_final author review.docx (Do Not Delete) 10/9/2014  4:48 PM 
2014] SOLVING JURISDICTION’S SOCIAL COST 665 
2. Incommensurability 
In addition to the trappings of maximization, existing monistic 
theories of jurisdictional value assume away problems associated with 
incommensurability.69 I argue that jurisdictional values are not only 
pluralistic; they are to some degree incommensurable—structural and 
efficiency values are not always capable of being reduced to (or 
measured by) a common value or metric. Because some jurisdictional 
values are incommensurable, we cannot weigh them out through cost-
benefit analysis. We must use a different approach. 
At the risk of oversimplification, values are commensurable if they 
can be expressed in terms of a single, common value or metric.70 
Obviously, many goods are commensurable because we can reduce their 
worth to dollars.71 Some metrics—such as inches and centimeters—
provide different ways to measure a particular value, and are 
commensurable because we can express one metric in terms of the 
other.72 
But other values or items are irreducible in terms of a common 
metric, and are thus incommensurable. Examples include weight and 
length;73 a career in the law versus a career as a clarinetist;74 a Mozart 
concerto versus one of Bob Dylan’s hit albums;75 and the choice 
between hiking in England and riding horses in Kentucky.76 In each of 
these pairings, there is no common, all-encompassing value that fully 
expresses all considerations that would be relevant to a choice between 
the two options.77 
Incommensurability does not mean we should refuse to choose 
between our options, however. Rational choice is possible among 
incommensurable values.78 After all, some law school graduates choose 
69. See Scharffs, supra note 57, at 1413. 
70. Sunstein, supra note 20, at 796. See generally INCOMMENSURABILITY, INCOMPARABILITY, 
AND PRACTICAL REASON (Ruth Chang ed., 1997); Matthew Alder, Law and Incommensurability, 
146 U. PA. L. REV. 1169 (1998). 
71. Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and Kinds of Valuation: Some Applications in Law, 
in INCOMMENSURABILITY, INCOMPARABILITY, AND PRACTICAL REASON, supra note 70, at 238. 
72. Scharffs, supra note 57, at 1390. 
73. Id. at 1391. 
74. JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 332 (1986). 
75. See Sunstein, supra note 20, at 799–800. 
76. Sunstein, supra note 71, at 240. 
77. See Scharffs, supra note 57, at 1390. 
78. E.g., Gregory S. Alexander, Pluralism and Property, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1017, 1019 
(2011); Gillian K. Hadfield, An Expressive Theory of Contract: From Feminist Dilemmas to a 
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careers as clarinetists, and some clarinetists choose careers as lawyers.79 
Within the law, legislators, judges, and rule makers often must choose 
among two or more incommensurable values.80 When deciding among 
plural, incommensurable values, the goal should be a rationally 
defensible choice, supported by reasoning that is persuasive to others.81 
Admittedly, these choices will be uncertain and debatable to some 
extent, given that there is no common metric that we can use to 
definitively compare incommensurable values.82 As several 
commentators have argued, however, we should recognize and embrace 
these uncertainties, rather than forcing incommensurable values through 
a one-dimensional cost-benefit analysis, which can have difficulty 
measuring unquantifiable effects.83 
The interests underlying jurisdictional nonwaivability illustrate the 
challenges associated with incommensurable values. There is no single, 
common value that can fully express all considerations relevant to a 
choice between structural values (such as federalism and separation of 
powers) and efficiency values (such as a desire to avoid litigation 
waste).84 For example, many efficiency values can be reduced to a 
monetary amount; at least some structural values likely cannot.85 And 
Reconceptualization of Rational Choice in Contract Law, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1235, 1259 (1998). 
79. For example, lawyer/clarinetist Paul Green turned down the co-principal clarinet position 
with the Jerusalem Symphony Orchestra in order to attend law school; after several years as a 
practicing attorney and law professor at Brooklyn Law School, he returned to a full-time career as a 
clarinetist. About Paul Green, PAULGREENMUSIC.COM, http://www.paulgreenmusic.com/about-
paulgreen.php (last visited Aug. 10, 2013). Incommensurability of the values underlying these 
careers did not prevent him from choosing between the two—not once, but twice. 
80. See Scharffs, supra note 57, at 1410–11. 
81. See id. at 1383; Gregory S. Alexander et al., A Statement of Progressive Property, 94 
CORNELL L. REV. 743, 744 (2009) (insisting that “despite the incommensurability of values, rational 
choice remains possible through reasoned deliberation,” including “non-deductive, non-algorithmic 
reflection” that is “both principled and contextual,” and that draws upon “critical judgment, 
tradition, experience, and discernment.”).  
82. Scharffs, supra note 57, at 1404. 
83. For critiques of cost-benefit analysis based on problems associated with 
incommensurability, see, e.g., Frank Ackerman & Liza Heinzerling, Pricing the Priceless: Cost-
Benefit Analysis of Environmental Protection, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1553, 1553, 1563–64 (2002); 
Henry S. Richardson, The Stupidity of the Cost-Benefit Standard, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 971, 986–89 
(2000). 
84. Indeed, there may not even be a common value or metric that we can use to fully compare 
sub-categories of each value set. For example, how does one measure effects on federalism versus 
effects on separation of powers? 
85. Arguably, some structural values underlying federal jurisdiction can be quantified and 
weighed under a metric commensurable with efficiency values. For example, Judge Richard Posner 
has used economic analysis to examine the optimal scope of federal jurisdiction. See RICHARD A. 
POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 273–303 (1996). As Judge Posner 
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although consideration for the proper role of federal courts within the 
American system of government is a common thread among structural 
values,86 efficiency values are likely agnostic to such concerns. In this 
way, jurisdictional values are incommensurable.87 
In light of the incommensurability of these values, it would be futile 
to use a cost-benefit analysis to sort out the advantages and 
disadvantages of nonwaivable jurisdictional rules.88 Suppose that we 
were able to quantify the average efficiency gains that would result from 
making jurisdictional restrictions waivable at the whim of the parties, 
reducing those gains to a dollar amount. Even if this were possible, how 
would we weigh these monetary efficiency gains against structural 
values that are decidedly nonmonetary in nature?89 For example, if 
waivable jurisdictional rules would save a federal court litigant $5,000 
on average, does that outweigh the corresponding incursion on 
federalism values that would result from federal courts hearing disputes 
that belong in the state court system?90 
A cost-benefit analysis between these incommensurable values is 
difficult, if not impossible.91 Revisiting the cake analogy above, 
weighing incommensurable jurisdictional values would be akin to 
weighing the costs of a half-cup more sugar versus the benefits of a half-
hour more baking time. Although both sugar and baking time are 
himself admits, however, not all structural sub-values can be analyzed in this way. See id. at 275 
(“Although my discussion will be in a scientific spirit, I emphasize that the relation between the 
states and the federal government cannot be regarded solely as an expedient one . . . .”). 
86. See, e.g., Henry P. Monaghan, Federal Courts, Cases and Materials, 83 HARV. L. REV. 
1753, 1754 (1970) (book review). 
87. Note that I argue that these values are incommensurable, not that they are incomparable. 
The absence of a single value or metric to fully express structural and efficiency interests does not 
mean there is no basis for rational comparison between those interests. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, 
Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943, 973 (1987) (“Competing interests 
are not, by definition, incomparable. Apples and oranges can be placed on a fruit scale or assigned a 
price in dollars per pound.”). 
88. See Ackerman & Heinzerling, supra note 83, at 1563–64; Richardson, supra note 83, at 
986–89. 
89. See, e.g., John M. Heyde, Comment, Is Contingent Valuation Worth the Trouble?, 62 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 331, 353 (1995) (noting “that monetary values, when encouraged by the law, tend to 
drive out other important, nonmonetary values”). 
90. See Kades, supra note 16, at 1, 3 (referencing cost-benefit analysis as a potential tool for 
evaluating the desirability of nonwaivable jurisdictional rules, but declining to weigh structural and 
efficiency values). 
91. This difficulty is consistent with the tendency among scholars to identify the interests 
underlying nonwaivable jurisdictional rules, while declining to resolve the tension between those 
interests. See, e.g., Collins, supra note 51, at 1895; Marshall, supra note 44, at 25–26; Stephens, 
supra note 44, at 39–40. 
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important values, they affect the cake in fundamentally different ways. 
There is no direct trade-off between these values, rendering cost-benefit 
analysis and other weighing approaches unhelpful. 
D. The Search for Equilibrium Among Competing Values 
How then can we reason about—and resolve—conflicts among 
jurisdictional values? In light of the inadequacy of maximization and 
weighing approaches, I argue that courts and rule makers must take a 
full inventory of relevant jurisdictional interests, and seek equilibrium 
among those values. This new approach recognizes that jurisdictional 
values are both pluralistic and incommensurable, and would ensure that 
jurisdictional rules more accurately reflect the true nature of the various 
interests at play. 
Initially, we must resist the temptation to force jurisdictional values 
through a bipolar constitutional balancing test.92 When considering the 
scope of constitutional rights, courts tend to use balancing mechanisms 
that weigh an individual’s right against the countervailing costs (usually 
the interests of the government).93 This type of balancing is essentially a 
two-dimensional exercise in constrained maximization: it aims to 
maximize individual rights subject to any corresponding governmental 
interests that outweigh those rights.94 
Bipolar balancing is problematic for resolving conflicts among 
jurisdictional values, however, because those conflicts tend to be 
multipolar in nature.95 In each case, consideration of jurisdictional issues 
can implicate a plurality of interests. First, the adjudication of 
jurisdictional issues obviously affects the benefits and costs of the 
parties before the court, as well as the court itself.96 Second, any 
92. See, e.g., Aziz Z. Huq, Standing for the Structural Constitution, 99 VA. L. REV. 1435, 1466 
(2013) (noting that Article III “implies a ‘bipolar model of the lawsuit, which assumes a dispute 
between two unitary, diametrically opposed interests,’ rather than ‘a multipolar model in which the 
party structure is sprawling and amorphous’” (quoting Susan Bandes, The Idea of a Case, 42 STAN. 
L. REV. 227, 250 (1990))). 
93. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334–35 (1976); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 
254, 262–63 (1970); see also Stephen Gardbaum, Limiting Constitutional Rights, 54 UCLA L. REV. 
789, 792 n.8 (2007) (noting that balancing “applies across the spectrum of constitutional rights”). 
94. See Huq, supra note 92, at 1469 (“In individual rights matters, a judge’s core task involves 
balancing an individual’s constitutional privilege against the aggregated interests of society at large 
as represented by the government.”). 
95. I do not contend that conflicts in jurisdictional values cannot be bipolar in nature; instead, I 
argue that most conflicts between these values are multipolar, implicating more than two broad 
categories of interests. 
96. Kades, supra note 16, at 1 (identifying the litigation costs that accompany jurisdictional 
rules); see also Dustin E. Buehler, Jurisdictional Incentives, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 105, 128–32 
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decision on jurisdiction that is binding or persuasive authority would 
affect nonparty incentives as well.97 Third, the decision by a federal 
court to exercise (or not exercise) jurisdiction can affect the interests of a 
multitude of institutional actors—i.e., Congress’s role in demarcating 
jurisdictional limits;98 the delicate “federal balance” between state and 
federal governments;99 and perhaps even a desire by one or more 
branches of the federal government to control the path of adjudication or 
limit judicial review.100 
Because jurisdictional values are multipolar, our goal should be 
equilibration, not maximization.101 Rather than maximizing particular 
interests or weighing values on a bipolar scale, courts and rule makers 
must promulgate jurisdictional rules by juggling a complex set of 
values.102 Initially, they should take a full inventory of the relevant 
interests at play.103 They then should formulate a rule that achieves 
equilibrium among these values.104 The goal is to find a rule that honors 
and accommodates all values, rather than maximizing one value set at 
the expense of another. 
As an alternative way to think of this equilibrium approach, I 
appropriate a metaphor that Brett Scharffs has invoked in the context of 
reasoning about incommensurables—the metaphor of a recipe.105 
Professor Scharffs notes that choices that encompass all relevant values 
implicitly rely on judgments as to “which values should be combined in 
(2012) (discussing how personal jurisdiction rules alter private-party benefits and costs). 
97. See, e.g., Leandra Lederman, Precedent Lost: Why Encourage Settlement, and Why Permit 
Non-Party Involvement in Settlements?, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 221, 227 (1999) (identifying the 
precedential value of judicial decisions as a public benefit of suit). 
98. See, e.g., Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U.S. 200, 207 (1993); Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. 
(8 How.) 441, 449 (1850). 
99. E.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 578 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also 
JENNA BEDNAR, THE ROBUST FEDERATION: PRINCIPLES OF DESIGN 68–69 (Stephen Ansolabehere 
et. al. eds., 2009) (noting that federalism implicates various types of behavioral incentives among 
state and federal actors). 
100. See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 786–92 (2008). 
101. Cf. Huq, supra note 92, at 1471–72 (noting that when the Supreme Court adjudicates 
structural issues, it “aims to strike an equilibrium among the branches,” rather than maximizing the 
power or interests of any one branch). 
102. See id. 
103. See Aleinikoff, supra note 87, at 977. 
104. Ideally, this process would generate a jurisdictional rule that would apply across the board 
to all cases, eliminating the need for an ad hoc case-by-case balancing of jurisdictional values, and 
enhancing certainty. See MELVILLE B. NIMMER, NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH: A TREATISE ON 
THE THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT §§ 2.02–2.03 (1992) (contrasting “definitional” and “ad 
hoc” balancing). 
105. Scharffs, supra note 57, at 1420–22. 
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what proportions to achieve an ideal of the type under consideration.”106 
This dovetails nicely with our cake analogy: 
[J]ust as baking a good cake will not be a matter of putting in as 
much of each ingredient as possible, reaching an [all things 
considered] judgment will involve not an attempt to maximize 
as many of the relevant values as possible, but rather will 
involve an effort to find or fashion a solution that will result in 
the proper mixture of values in the proper quantities. There may 
also be analogies to matters of timing and technique that are 
relevant to following a recipe.107 
Thus, when reasoning about jurisdiction, it may be useful to view the 
underlying values as ingredients, and the optimal jurisdictional rule as a 
carefully refined recipe that combines those ingredients. 
Fortunately, judges are familiar with this type of approach. To some 
extent, courts already balance multipolar interests and seek equilibrium 
when resolving conflicts between structural values.108 For example, the 
Supreme Court’s description of both separation of powers and 
federalism suggests that it aims for equilibration of the component 
interests.109 
And yet, I do not pretend that it will be easy for courts to adopt an 
equilibration approach in the jurisdictional context. I anticipate two 
primary criticisms of the approach that I describe here. First, some may 
say that the process of describing component values and seeking 
equilibration among those interests is inherently subjective and 
untethered.110 Although I agree equilibration of jurisdictional values 
106. Id. at 1421. 
107. Id. 
108. See, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 851 (1986) (using 
a multipolar balancing test to assess the constitutionality of legislative courts); United States v. 
Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705–06 (1974) (rejecting absolute presidential immunity from judicial 
process, in part because of a “confrontation with other [separation-of-powers] values”). 
109. E.g., Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 452 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring) 
(“Separation of powers . . . operates on a horizontal axis to secure a proper balance of legislative, 
executive, and judicial authority.”); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 578 (1995) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring) (“[T]he federal balance is too essential a part of our constitutional structure and plays 
too vital a role in securing freedom for us to admit inability to intervene when one or the other level 
of Government has tipped the scales too far.”); see also Benjamin R. Civiletti, The Attorney 
General’s Duty to Defend and Enforce Constitutionally Objectionable Legislation, 43 OP. ATT’Y 
GEN. 275, 276 (1980) (describing separation of powers as “the equilibrium established within our 
constitutional system”). 
110. Commentators already have raised this objection in response to courts’ tendency to seek 
equilibration among structural values. See, e.g., M. Elizabeth Magill, The Real Separation in 
Separation of Powers Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1127, 1194 (2000) (arguing that, in the context of 
separation of powers, “[w]e do not know what ‘balance’ means, and we do not know how it is 
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cannot produce a single answer with absolute certainty,111 it is not my 
intention to do so. Instead, my goal is to let the debate begin—to 
encourage a dialogue among courts and scholars that considers the full 
range of jurisdictional values, with the shared goal of improving 
jurisdictional rules. 
Second, the approach I advocate here undoubtedly is contrary to the 
traditional notion of rigid, inflexible jurisdictional rules. As a result, 
some will point out that this simply is not how jurisdiction works.112 
Indeed, it is possible that this line of attack would lead courts and 
commentators to reject an equilibration approach out of hand.113 
That said, I am not convinced that jurisdiction is as unyielding as 
some suggest. After all, judicially-created limitations exist that restrict 
the invocation of jurisdictional defects—most notably, litigants cannot 
collaterally attack the jurisdictional basis of a final judgment.114 
Additionally, during the first century of the Republic, federal jurisdiction 
was malleable, and waivable by the parties in some instances.115 During 
that time, federal courts relied on the pleadings to determine the 
existence of jurisdiction,116 and it was relatively easy for parties to 
manipulate federal jurisdiction through collusion.117 And to the extent 
that our modern mandatory and rigid jurisdictional norms are grounded 
achieved or maintained”). 
111. Stated another way, multiple equilibria may be possible in the context of jurisdictional 
rules—several different combinations of jurisdictional values may produce a stable (and perhaps 
even desirable) jurisdictional rule. 
112. See, e.g., Scott Dodson, Hybridizing Jurisdiction, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1439, 1441 (2011) 
(noting that courts and commentators repeatedly reference the unbending nature of jurisdictional 
rules, “entrench[ing] the idea of jurisdiction as a rigid antipode to nonjurisdictional law”); Laura S. 
Fitzgerald, Is Jurisdiction Jurisdictional?, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1207, 1214 (2001) (“The Supreme 
Court has always declared subject matter jurisdiction an absolute precondition to the exercise of 
federal judicial power.”). 
113. See, e.g., Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 577 (1999) (describing subject-
matter jurisdiction as “inflexible and without exception” (quoting Mansfield, C. & L. M. Ry. Co. v. 
Swan, 111 U.S. 379, 382 (1884))); Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998) 
(same). 
114. Chicot Cnty. Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371, 376 (1940); see also 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 12 (1982). 
115. See, e.g., Collins, supra note 51, at 1838–40; Fitzgerald, supra note 112, at 1245–73. 
116. Collins, supra note 51, at 1838–40; see also Sheppard v. Graves, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 505, 
510 (1853) (noting that “wherever jurisdiction shall be averred in the pleadings, . . . it must be taken 
primâ facie as existing”). 
117. Common law procedures traditionally required the defendant to file a plea in abatement in 
order to contest jurisdiction. See Collins, supra note 51, at 1838–39. A defendant’s failure to do so 
was tantamount to waiver of the jurisdictional objection. Id. at 1839. 
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in the commands of constitutional language,118 federal courts have 
shown a willingness to adopt multifaceted balancing approaches in 
similar contexts.119 
II. DECONSTRUCTING JURISDICTIONAL VALUES 
For these reasons, courts should adopt a pluralistic approach to 
jurisdictional questions, and should aim for equilibration among values, 
rather than using a categorical, monistic approach. In this Part, I 
catalogue the various values implicated by nonwaivable jurisdictional 
rules. Using the recipe metaphor, this Part provides our mise en 
place120—a set of ingredients federal judges and rule makers should 
draw on when refining an optimal jurisdictional recipe. 
I start by analyzing structural values underlying jurisdictional rules, 
including separation-of-powers and federalism concerns.121 I then 
examine the efficiency interests implicated by jurisdictional 
nonwaivability.122 
A. Delineating Structural Values 
Federal court jurisdiction under Article III implicates “the two great 
structural principles of the Constitution—federalism and separation of 
powers.”123 Courts tend to treat these two structural value sets as 
monolithic, deferring to the legislative prerogatives of Congress when 
discussing separation-of-powers values, and to the prerogatives of states 
when considering federalism values. 
These structural values are not so simple, however. In reality, the 
structural values underlying jurisdictional rules are decidedly pluralistic. 
118. See U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1–2. 
119. Judicial interpretation of the First Amendment provides an example of courts’ willingness 
to depart from seemingly absolute constitutional language. Although the Constitution states that 
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,” U.S. CONST. amend. I 
(emphasis added), the Supreme Court has used several multifaceted tests for determining whether 
government conduct violates the Establishment Clause. See, e.g., Cnty. of Allegheny v. Am. Civil 
Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 573, 592–94 (1989) (applying endorsement test); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 
403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971) (providing a three-pronged test for Establishment Clause violations). 
120. See MARGUERITE-MARIE DUBOIS, DICTIONNAIRE FRANÇAIS ANGLAIS 477 (1981) 
(defining “mise en place” as “placing, putting, setting”); Pete Wells, Cooking with Dexter: Prep 
School, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 14, 2010, at 40 (noting that “mise en place” refers “to the practice 
of having all the ingredients and tools set to go before you even light the stove”). 
121. See infra Part II.A. 
122. See infra Part II.B. 
123. Akhil Reed Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article III: Separating the Two Tiers of 
Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. REV. 205, 205 (1985). 
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I argue that separation-of-powers values include two discrete sets of sub-
values, one focused on legislative prerogatives and the other on judicial 
prerogatives.124 Similarly, in the context of jurisdictional rules, 
federalism implicates interests vital to states and the federal government; 
both Congress and the federal courts play essential roles in identifying 
and demarcating relevant sub-values.125 
1. Separation of Powers: Legislative and Judicial Prerogatives 
In the jurisdictional context, judicial rhetoric casts separation of 
powers as a one-dimensional value: the role of the courts is to merely 
respect and effectuate jurisdictional boundaries, as defined by Congress. 
Federal judges repeatedly stress they are powerless to hear cases and 
controversies outside of their jurisdiction,126 and point to Congress’s 
broad power over such matters.127 They also insist that transcending 
jurisdictional boundaries would amount to judicial usurpation of the 
federal constitutional design.128 Taken at face value, these statements 
suggest separation of powers is a one-way street: legislative prerogatives 
trump all other considerations, and Congress alone gets to decide which 
cases federal courts hear. 
This conventional notion of separation of powers is somewhat 
incomplete, however. Nonwaivable jurisdictional rules implicate at least 
two discrete separation-of-powers sub-values: legislative prerogatives to 
demarcate jurisdictional boundaries, and judicial prerogatives to 
preserve the essential role of federal courts. 
Congress clearly has broad power over federal jurisdiction.129 It has 
significant power to curtail or eliminate the Supreme Court’s appellate 
jurisdiction,130 and has wide power over the jurisdiction of the lower 
124. See infra Part II.A.1. 
125. See infra Part II.A.2. 
126. E.g., Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998); United States v. 
Pomales-Lebron, 513 F.3d 262, 269 (1st Cir. 2008); Orff v. United States, 358 F.3d 1137, 1149 (9th 
Cir. 2004); Crotwell v. Hockman-Lewis Ltd., 734 F.2d 767, 769 (11th Cir. 1984). 
127. See, e.g., Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U.S. 200, 207 (1993); Lockerty v. Phillips, 
319 U.S. 182, 187 (1943). 
128. E.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 515 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Fed. Mar. Bd. v. 
Isbrandtsen Co., 356 U.S. 481, 523 n.8 (1958). 
129. Many scholars have emphasized this point over the years. See, e.g., Paul Bator, 
Congressional Power over the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 27 VILL. L. REV. 1030, 1037–41 
(1982); Gerald Gunther, Congressional Power to Curtail Federal Court Jurisdiction: An 
Opinionated Guide to the Ongoing Debate, 36 STAN. L. REV. 895, 917–22 (1984); Herbert 
Wechsler, The Courts and the Constitution, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 1001, 1005 (1965). 
130. See Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 514 (1869). 
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federal courts.131 As one judge has noted, “[w]hen it comes to 
jurisdiction of the federal courts, truly, to paraphrase the scripture, the 
Congress giveth, and the Congress taketh away.”132 Thus, Congress 
arguably is the only institutional actor with the ability to consider the 
policy interests underlying jurisdictional rules—i.e., litigation incentives, 
litigation waste, and the allocation of cases between state and federal 
courts. 
Congressional power over federal jurisdiction is not unlimited, 
however.133 Legislative demarcation of jurisdictional boundaries must 
comply with constitutional provisions external to Article III, such as the 
Due Process Clause and Suspension Clause.134 Several scholars also 
have argued that Congress cannot limit jurisdiction in a way that 
interferes with the essential role of the federal courts in the constitutional 
design.135 Moreover, federal judges retain at least some control over the 
parameters of their own jurisdiction—for example, judicially-created 
abstention doctrines allow courts to stay or dismiss cases for which 
jurisdiction exists.136 
Thus, in reality, separation of powers is a two-way street, and it 
would be inaccurate to frame jurisdictional values as exclusively rooted 
in legislative prerogatives. Jurisdiction implicates values important to 
the judiciary as well—something that federal judges explicitly recognize 
131. See Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441, 449 (1850) (stating that “Congress may 
withhold from any court of its creation jurisdiction of any of the enumerated controversies,” and 
that “[c]ourts created by statute can have no jurisdiction but such as the statute confers.”). 
132. Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 366 F. Supp. 51, 55 
(D.D.C. 1973). 
133. See, e.g., Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal 
Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1364–65 (1953) (rejecting the notion that 
Congress has plenary control over federal jurisdiction). 
134. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 771–92 (2008) (holding that Congress must 
comply with the requirements of the Suspension Clause when limiting federal court review of 
enemy combatant determinations by Combatant Status Review Tribunals); Battaglia v. Gen. Motors 
Corp., 169 F.2d 254, 257 (2d Cir. 1948) (“[T]he exercise by Congress of its control over jurisdiction 
is subject to compliance with at least the requirements of the Fifth Amendment.”). 
135. E.g., Hart, supra note 133, at 1365; Leonard G. Ratner, Congressional Power over the 
Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 157, 201–02 (1960). Some have 
even suggested that Article III obligates Congress to vest some federal court with jurisdiction over 
certain cases. E.g., Amar, supra note 123, at 206; Robert N. Clinton, A Mandatory View of Federal 
Court Jurisdiction: A Guided Quest for the Original Understanding of Article III, 132 U. PA. L. 
REV. 741, 749–50 (1984); Theodore Eisenberg, Congressional Authority to Restrict Lower Federal 
Court Jurisdiction, 83 YALE L.J. 498, 532–33 (1974). 
136. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 783 (5th ed. 2007) (noting that 
abstention doctrines are “judicially created rules” that allow federal courts to avoid deciding some 
matters “even though all jurisdictional and justiciability requirements are met”). 
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from time to time, particularly when pushing back against legislative 
efforts to circumscribe meaningful judicial review.137 Granted, judges 
often assert judicial prerogatives subtly, framing their interests in ways 
that appear consistent with the prerogatives of other branches.138 But my 
underlying point remains true: separation-of-powers values are 
multifaceted in the jurisdictional context. Both Congress and federal 
courts have skin in the game, and also the ability to craft jurisdictional 
rules. 
2. Federalism: State and Federal Prerogatives 
Judicial opinions on jurisdictional issues also have a tendency to cast 
federalism as a one-dimensional value. When discussing the 
implications of subject-matter jurisdiction, federal courts tend to 
emphasize state prerogatives, sometimes ignoring the interests of the 
federal government in the process.139 The opinions that do reference 
federal interests frequently stress that Congress is the only actor that can 
define and assert those interests in our federal system.140 
State interests certainly are important. States have an interest in their 
own courts being able to hear disputes without undue interference by 
federal courts.141 Additionally, as Richard Fallon notes, one of the major 
premises of a Federalist model of federal jurisdiction is that “[s]tate 
courts are constitutionally as competent as federal courts to adjudicate 
137. See, e.g., Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 771–92 (striking down the Detainee Treatment Act, 
partly on separation-of-powers grounds); In re Nat’l Sec. Letter, 930 F. Supp. 2d 1064, 1077 (N.D. 
Cal. 2013) (holding that the National Security Letter statute violates separation-of-powers principles 
because it “attempts to circumscribe a court’s ability to review the necessity of nondisclosure 
orders”). 
138. See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 173–77 (1803) (refusing to issue a writ of 
mandamus to Marbury on jurisdictional grounds, while establishing the power of judicial review); 
see also Robert J. Reinstein & Mark C. Rahdert, Reconstructing Marbury, 57 ARK. L. REV. 729, 
771 (2005) (“As generations of American law students have learned, [Chief Justice] Marshall and 
his Court may have ‘lost the battle’ over Marbury’s commission, but they ‘won the war’ of judicial 
power by advancing the principle of judicial review.”). 
139. See, e.g., Anderson v. H&R Block, Inc., 287 F.3d 1038, 1041 (11th Cir. 2002) (referencing 
“the states’ authority to resolve disputes in their own courts,” but not interests associated with 
federal courts’ authority to resolve disputes), rev’d on other grounds, 539 U.S. 1 (2003). But see In 
re Carter, 618 F.2d 1093, 1098 (1980) (stating that under the federalism inquiry, courts must give 
“due regard for the constitutional allocation of powers between the state and federal systems”). 
140. See, e.g., Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 374 (1978) (noting that 
congressional limitations on federal jurisdiction “must be neither disregarded nor evaded”); Chase 
Bank USA, N.A. v. City of Cleveland, 695 F.3d 548, 553 (6th Cir. 2012) (noting that federal courts 
can adjudicate only those claims “that have been entrusted to them by a jurisdictional grant by 
Congress”). 
141. Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 108–09 (1941). 
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federal issues.”142 To some extent, conveyance of jurisdiction to federal 
courts implies the opposite—that state courts are inadequate.143 In this 
way, federal jurisdiction unquestionably implicates state interests. 
Much like separation-of-powers concerns, however, federalism values 
are not monolithic. Legislative conveyance of federal court 
jurisdiction144—as well as statutory authorization for removal of cases 
from state to federal court145—reflects Congress’s judgment that 
significant federal interests justify the availability of a federal forum.146 
And at times it can even reflect Congress’s conclusion that federal courts 
provide a superior forum for the adjudication of certain matters.147 
Moreover, Congress is not the only federal actor that defines this 
federal interest. Courts also play an essential role in asserting and 
evaluating federal interests, sometimes at the expense of state court 
jurisdiction. For example, the judicially developed test for evaluating 
whether a state law claim presents a federal question explicitly requires a 
“substantial” and “serious federal interest.”148 Conversely, the Supreme 
Court has cited state interests underlying federalism as the primary 
reason for its occasional abstention from exercising jurisdiction that 
otherwise exists.149 
142. Richard H. Fallon, The Ideologies of Federal Courts Law, 74 VA. L. REV. 1141, 1153 
(1988). 
143. Section 1983—creating a claim for violations of federal constitutional rights by state 
actors—is perhaps the most telling example of a congressional judgment that state courts are (or at 
least can be) inadequate. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012); Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972) 
(“The very purpose of § 1983 was to interpose the federal courts between the States and the people, 
as guardians of the people’s federal rights . . . .”). 
144. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a) (2012) (jurisdiction for actions against foreign states); id. 
§ 1331 (federal question jurisdiction); id. § 1332 (diversity jurisdiction); id. § 1333 (admiralty and 
maritime jurisdiction). 
145. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (2012) (providing for removal of civil actions). 
146. See, e.g., JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE 
FEDERAL COURTS 28 (1995), reprinted in 166 F.R.D. 49 (1996) (encouraging Congress to vest 
federal courts with jurisdiction over civil cases only when it “further[s] clearly defined and justified 
federal interests”). 
147. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2012) (vesting federal courts with exclusive jurisdiction 
over copyright and patent claims). I do not mean to wade too far into the literature on federal and 
state court parity here. See generally RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART & WECHSLER’S THE 
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 278–83 (6th ed. 2009) (citing literature and empirical 
studies on parity). As I have argued elsewhere, the structure of the Constitution—specifically 
Congress’s power to establish or not establish lower federal courts—seems to assume that parity 
can exist, while delegating judgment on matters of parity to Congress. See Dustin E. Buehler, 
Revisiting Rooker-Feldman: Extending the Doctrine to State Court Interlocutory Orders, 36 FLA. 
ST. U. L. REV. 373, 398–99 (2009). 
148. Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 313 (2005). 
149. See, e.g., Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 237–38 (1984). 
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In other words, much like separation of powers, federalism is a two-
way street. It implicates both state prerogatives and federal 
prerogatives.150 Furthermore, the legislative branch does not have a 
monopoly on defining federal interests—instead, both Congress and the 
federal judiciary play key roles in identifying and guarding the federal 
government’s prerogatives.151 
3. Working with Structural Values 
Any attempt to incorporate the full scope of these values into a new 
approach to jurisdiction begs the question: How do we work with these 
structural ingredients, and how rigid or malleable are they? I make a few 
observations here that will be relevant to the discussion below. 
First, jurisdictional values are more flexible than they appear—we can 
mitigate many structural concerns by using Congress as the actor for 
reform.152 By vesting Congress with broad power over federal 
jurisdiction, the Constitution arguably gives the legislative branch 
discretion to demarcate an optimal balance between state and federal 
courts.153 Moreover, as long as jurisdictional rules do not interfere with 
the essential role of the federal courts, they incorporate separation-of-
powers values by fully respecting both legislative and judicial 
prerogatives.154 
Second, federal courts can (and already do) play a key role in 
ensuring that jurisdictional rules are flexible and accommodate federal 
prerogatives. For example, federal courts have grafted the “legal 
certainty” test onto the statutory amount-in-controversy requirement for 
diversity jurisdiction,155 and impose a “time of filing” rule for assessing 
150. See Michele E. Gilman, Presidents, Preemption, and the States, 26 CONST. COMMENT. 
339, 349 (2010) (“Respect for federalism does not mean that state interests should always trump 
federal interests; rather, it requires fair consideration of and deliberation about state interests.”). 
151. See, e.g., John O. McGinnis & Ilya Somin, Federalism vs. States’ Rights: A Defense of 
Judicial Review in a Federal System, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 89, 121–22 (2004) (arguing that courts are 
often in a better position than Congress to assert and evaluate federalism interests). But see LARRY 
D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES 131, 135 (2004) (arguing that courts should have minimal 
involvement in federalism issues). 
152. Alternatively, Congress can pass a law delegating rulemaking authority to another entity. 
See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2012) (delegating procedural rulemaking authority to the Supreme 
Court). 
153. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 147, at 7–9 (recounting the history of the Madisonian 
Compromise, under which Congress can choose whether to create lower federal courts). 
154. See supra notes 133–135 and accompanying text. 
155. See St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 288–89 (1938). 
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the citizenship of the parties.156 Under these judge-made rules, diversity 
jurisdiction exists as long as the complaint pleads a jurisdictionally 
sufficient amount, and as long as diversity of citizenship existed at the 
time plaintiff commenced her action—even when the amount later 
proves to be insufficient or the parties change their citizenship.157 Both 
rules show federal courts’ willingness to put a judicial gloss on 
jurisdictional statutes when there is good reason to do so. 
Third, there is an outer limit to the flexibility of jurisdictional rules—
at some point we run up against structural concerns that trump other 
considerations. Most notably, although Congress could make statutory 
jurisdictional requirements waivable, it probably cannot render 
constitutional requirements waivable.158 And even if that were possible, 
jurisdictional waivability at some point would violate separation-of-
powers notions by encroaching on essential judicial prerogatives.159 For 
example, if jurisdiction were completely waivable at the whim of the 
parties, then a party’s waiver of jurisdictional defects could possibly 
insulate important Article III questions from judicial review. 
Ultimately, there are two key take-away points here. First, our current 
police-jurisdiction-at-all-costs approach fails to consider the full 
implications of structural values underlying jurisdictional rules. Second, 
a completely passive judicial approach (allowing unlimited private-party 
waiver of jurisdiction) is problematic as well. Jurisdictional rules must 
be more flexible, but courts must stay involved. 
B. Unpacking Efficiency Values 
Having examined structural values, I now turn to the efficiency values 
underlying nonwaivable jurisdictional rules. In doing so, I provide one 
of the first economic analyses of jurisdiction’s social cost.160 First, I 
outline the goal of an efficiency approach: socially optimal jurisdictional 
rules.161 I then describe the various private-party incentives underlying 
156. See Mollan v. Torrance, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 537, 539–40 (1824). 
157. RICHARD D. FREER, CIVIL PROCEDURE 184, 188 (2d ed. 2009). 
158. I say “probably” here because some have made the argument that “the ‘necessary and 
proper’ clause of the Constitution gives Congress power to avoid wasteful burdens on the courts by 
setting a time limit for raising [constitutional] jurisdictional questions.” 13 WRIGHT ET AL., supra 
note 33, § 3522, at 137; see also Dobbs, supra note 15, at 520–21. But see Collins, supra note 51, at 
1888 (questioning the validity of this argument). 
159. See supra notes 133–136 and accompanying text. 
160. My analysis builds on an excellent paper by Eric Kades, which examines various 
incentives underlying jurisdictional rules. See Kades, supra note 16. 
161. See infra Part II.B.1. 
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jurisdictional rules.162 I contend that nonwaivable jurisdictional rules 
incentivize inefficient behavior by both plaintiffs and defendants. 
Finally, I note that federal judges have inadequate incentives to police 
their own jurisdiction early on in many cases.163 
1. The Goal: Socially Optimal Jurisdictional Rules 
From an efficiency standpoint, jurisdictional rules are socially optimal 
if they encourage procedural litigation and jurisdictional dismissals only 
when society’s economic benefits from litigation and dismissal exceed 
total social costs.164 
The efficiency costs of jurisdictional litigation and dismissals include, 
most notably, the parties’ litigation costs and the court’s adjudication 
costs.165 They also include consequential expenses, such as the cost of 
duplicative proceedings in state court following a federal court 
dismissal,166 or the cost of the entire federal court proceedings 
(discovery, motions practice, trial, etc.) in cases where jurisdictional 
dismissal occurs late in the trial court process or for the first time on 
appeal.167 
Although the costs of jurisdictional litigation often overshadow its 
benefits, benefits do exist. First, positive externalities can arise from 
jurisdictional litigation.168 Published jurisdictional decisions have 
precedential value for similarly situated litigants,169 and deter other 
162. See infra Part II.B.2. 
163. See infra Part II.B.3. 
164. For the sake of brevity and expositional clarity, I am glossing over more intricate 
definitions and measures of social optimality. See, e.g., Edward Rubin, The Possibilities and 
Limitations of Privatization, 123 HARV. L. REV. 890, 913 n.116 (2010) (acknowledging “various 
definitions of efficiency, including Pareto optimality and Kaldor-Hicks efficiency,” but arguing that 
“in the context of implementing a previously established goal, efficiency can be defined as 
achieving [a] goal at the lowest cost, subject to all applicable constraints”). 
165. Most commonly, such costs include the expenses associated with a Rule 12(b)(1) motion 
to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1). 
166. See Hoagland v. Sandberg, Phoenix & Von Gontard, P.C., 385 F.3d 737, 739–40 (7th Cir. 
2004) (noting that, as a result of a federal court’s dismissal on jurisdictional grounds, “the parties 
will often find themselves having to start their litigation over from the beginning [in state court], 
perhaps after it has gone all the way through to judgment”). 
167. See Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 2166, 2179 (1988) (“Parties 
often spend years litigating claims only to learn that their efforts and expense were wasted in a court 
that lacked jurisdiction.”). 
168. A “harmful externality is defined as a cost or benefit that the voluntary actions of one or 
more people imposes or confers on a third party or parties without their consent.” ROBERT COOTER 
& THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 45 (1988).  
169. See Lederman, supra note 97, at 227. 
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parties from transcending jurisdictional boundaries. Second, 
jurisdictional litigation effectuates the structural values discussed above, 
giving courts an opportunity to consider and assert interests relating to 
separation of powers and federalism.170 
In terms of social benefits, social costs, and other efficiency sub-
values, the timing of jurisdictional litigation is important.171 Ideally, 
jurisdictional rules should incentivize private-party actors and courts to 
raise jurisdictional defects at a point that maximizes social welfare 
(defined as social benefits minus social costs).172 
For most cases, the outset of litigation presumably would be the 
socially optimal moment to raise jurisdictional defects.173 At that 
moment, the parties and court have incurred minimal litigation and 
adjudication costs, and a jurisdictional dismissal would be less wasteful 
than it would be later on in the proceedings.174 Moreover, the social 
benefits of jurisdiction arguably are maximized at that point as well—
early action on jurisdiction serves as a clear affirmation of the structural 
values underlying jurisdictional nonwaivability.175 
2. The Problem: Perverse Private-Party Incentives 
There appears to be a consensus among scholars, however, that 
jurisdictional rules often are inefficient and create needless social 
waste.176 In part, I attribute this social cost to the perverse private-party 
170. See supra Part II.A. 
171. Cf. David A. Super, Against Flexibility, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1375, 1415 (2011) (noting 
that “[a] delay in resolving civil litigation ordinarily causes the ultimate decision’s value to decline 
more rapidly for plaintiffs than the delay produces value for defendants, making it socially 
inefficient”). 
172. See STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 2–3 (2004) 
(noting that an economic analysis of the law seeks to adopt legal rules that maximize social 
welfare). 
173. Although this statement is true for most cases, it is not true for all cases. If a case is fairly 
straightforward on the merits but presents thorny or complex jurisdictional issues, then adjudication 
of jurisdiction at the outset of the suit may be inefficient in that particular case. 
174. See Matthew I. Hall, The Partially Prudential Doctrine of Mootness, 77 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 562, 615 (2009) (observing that “dismissal . . . at an early stage of the litigation may conserve 
judicial resources, whereas dismissal at a later stage of an action, when significant judicial resources 
have already been expended, may waste judicial resources”). 
175. Stated another way, if a court proceeds with an adjudication of the merits without 
adequately analyzing jurisdictional issues, there is a risk that the court is exercising power it does 
not have. 
176. See, e.g., Thomas E. Baker, Imagining the Alternative Futures of the U.S. Courts of 
Appeals, 28 GA. L. REV. 913, 947 (1994) (arguing that “jurisdictional rules need to be clear and 
certain, so that the resources of the parties and the courts are not wasted in elaborate proceedings to 
determine if there is subject matter jurisdiction”); Jonathan Remy Nash, On the Efficient 
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incentives of nonwaivable jurisdictional rules. First, existing rules 
incentivize parties to file jurisdictionally suspect lawsuits in federal 
court.177 Second, the rules incentivize defendants to adopt a wait-and-see 
approach—the defendant waits until the federal court renders a decision 
on the merits, and uses a jurisdictional defect as a tool to vacate an 
adverse judgment.178 Third, because existing rules allow either party to 
raise a jurisdictional defect at any time, plaintiffs have incentives to wait 
as well.179 Meanwhile, the parties and court continue to incur litigation 
costs. 
a. Incentives to File Jurisdictionally Suspect Lawsuits 
Many—perhaps most—plaintiffs file lawsuits in federal court only 
after concluding federal subject-matter jurisdiction exists.180 
Nevertheless, our current jurisdictional rules fail to adequately 
disincentivize plaintiffs from filing jurisdictionally suspect actions in 
federal court. Specifically, the absence of a particular moment early in 
litigation when jurisdiction is conclusively resolved—and beyond 
further challenge—makes the existence of jurisdiction (and the odds of 
jurisdictional litigation) highly uncertain in many cases. As a result of 
this uncertainty, some plaintiffs choose to roll the dice and file a lawsuit 
in federal court, even though they have knowledge of a potentially fatal 
jurisdictional defect. 
At first blush, this seems counterintuitive—one would assume that 
many plaintiffs would seek to avoid the uncertainty of federal court 
jurisdiction by filing their lawsuits in state court. State court subject-
matter jurisdiction is broad,181 and plaintiffs filing state court actions 
usually do not incur the costs and risks associated with jurisdictional 
litigation.182 In contrast, federal jurisdiction is more uncertain because 
Deployment of Rules and Standards to Define Federal Jurisdiction, 65 VAND. L. REV. 509, 531 
(2012) (noting that “scarce judicial resources may appear to have been wasted upon a belated 
decision that subject matter jurisdiction is absent”). 
177. See infra Part II.B.2.a. 
178. See infra Part II.B.2.b. 
179. See infra Part II.B.2.c. 
180. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(1) (requiring that a plaintiff’s complaint include “a short and plain 
statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction”). 
181. See 13 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 33, § 3522 (noting that “[m]ost state courts are courts of 
general jurisdiction”). 
182. This assumes that a plaintiff files in the correct state court. See Edson R. Sunderland, 
Problems Connected with the Operation of a State Court System, 1950 WIS. L. REV. 585, 585–86 
(noting that state court systems often are divided into a variety of separate divisions handling 
specialized matters). 
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three alternative scenarios are possible: (1) jurisdictional litigation might 
occur, and a federal court might conclude it has jurisdiction, proceeding 
to the merits of the case;183 (2) jurisdictional litigation might occur, and 
a federal court might conclude it does not have jurisdiction, dismissing 
the case so the plaintiff can re-file in state court;184 or (3) jurisdictional 
litigation might not occur at all, perhaps because neither the defendant 
nor the court notices a jurisdictional defect.185 Due to this uncertainty, in 
many cases a plaintiff’s expected cost of litigating in federal court may 
be higher than litigating in state court.186 
There are circumstances, however, in which plaintiffs have an 
incentive to incur these risks and costs associated with uncertain federal 
jurisdiction, notwithstanding the social cost generated by jurisdictionally 
suspect lawsuits. For example, a plaintiff might roll the dice on federal 
court litigation—despite having knowledge of a jurisdictional defect—if 
a large positive disparity exists between the plaintiff’s expected federal 
court benefit and expected state court benefit.187 Similarly, a plaintiff 
183. Plaintiff’s expected benefit if jurisdictional litigation occurs, and if the federal court 
upholds its own jurisdiction and proceeds to the merits, would be pL [pJ (p1 (L1) – (c1 + cJ))], where 
pL represents the odds that jurisdictional litigation will occur, pJ represents the odds that the federal 
court will conclude that it has jurisdiction, p1 is the probability that the plaintiff wins on the merits 
in federal court, L1 represents plaintiff’s expected judgment amount if plaintiff wins, c1 represents 
plaintiff’s costs of litigating the merits in federal court, and cJ is the cost plaintiff incurs to litigate 
jurisdiction. 
184. Plaintiff’s expected benefit if jurisdictional litigation occurs, the federal court dismisses for 
lack of jurisdiction, and the plaintiff then re-files the case in state court would be pL [(1 – pJ)(p2 (L2) 
– (c2 + cJ))], where pL represents the odds that jurisdictional litigation will occur, (1 – pJ) represents 
the odds that the federal court will conclude that it lacks jurisdiction, p2 is the probability that the 
plaintiff wins on the merits in state court, L2 represents the expected judgment amount if the 
plaintiff wins in state court, c2 represents plaintiff’s costs of litigating the merits in state court, and 
cJ is the cost plaintiff incurs to litigate jurisdiction in federal court before the case is dismissed. 
185. Plaintiff’s expected benefit if jurisdictional litigation does not occur and the federal court 
proceeds to the merits would be (1 – pL)(p1 (L1) – c1), where (1 – pL) represents the odds that 
jurisdictional litigation will not occur, p1 is the probability that the plaintiff wins on the merits in 
federal court, L1 represents the expected judgment amount if the plaintiff wins, and c1 represents 
plaintiff’s costs of litigating the merits in federal court. 
186. The plaintiff’s total expected federal court benefit would be pL [pJ (p1 (L1) – c1) + (1 – pJ)(p2 
(L2) – c2) – cJ ] + (1 – pL)(p1 (L1) – c1), which is the sum of the three alternative federal jurisdictional 
scenarios described above. In contrast, a plaintiff’s expected benefit of litigating in a state court of 
general jurisdiction is simpler (reflecting an absence of jurisdictional litigation): p2 (L2) – c2. If non-
jurisdictional variables (i.e., probability that plaintiff wins, judgment amount, litigation costs) are 
constant between federal and state courts, plaintiffs would always choose to litigate in state court, in 
order to minimize litigation costs. 
187. Most notably, this could occur if a plaintiff seeks to enforce a federal law claim. See 
Michael E. Solimine & James L. Walker, Constitutional Litigation in Federal and State Courts: An 
Empirical Analysis of Judicial Parity, 10 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 213, 213–14 (1983) (noting that 
scholars have suggested that state courts can be “hostile to the vindication of [federal] rights”). 
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may file a jurisdictionally suspect lawsuit if he or she thinks it is 
unlikely that the defendant or the court will discover the jurisdictional 
defect.188 And even if a plaintiff’s intentions are entirely noble, the cost 
of investigating jurisdiction before the commencement of suit may deter 
the plaintiff from doing so.189 
The problem is that our current approach to jurisdictional rules further 
incentivizes this type of inefficient behavior by plaintiffs. There is no 
moment early in litigation when federal district courts conclusively 
resolve jurisdictional issues;190 instead, jurisdictional questions linger 
like a cloud of doubt over many lawsuits. If the parties do not file a Rule 
12(b)(1) motion, a jurisdictional defect can easily escape a court’s 
attention at the moment when dismissal is least costly.191 Even if the 
parties litigate jurisdiction early on, an order that erroneously upholds 
jurisdiction is not immediately appealable,192 and the parties might 
litigate for years before an appellate court conclusively resolves whether 
jurisdiction exists. Faced with this uncertainty, plaintiffs who are 
otherwise inclined to file lawsuits in federal court know there is a good 
chance they can get away with a jurisdictional defect—if not forever, at 
least until they can obtain a more favorable settlement. 
b. Incentives for Defendants to Wait and See 
Jurisdictional nonwaivability incentivizes inefficient behavior by 
defendants as well. Sometimes the defendant has little incentive to 
investigate and raise a jurisdictional defect early on, when the social 
costs of a defect can be minimized. Instead, it may be in the defendant’s 
interest to wait to fully investigate jurisdiction, or to withhold a 
jurisdictional objection until after the court renders a judgment on the 
merits. If there is an adverse result at that point, the defendant then has a 
powerful incentive to fully investigate jurisdiction, using any defect as a 
procedural trump card to vacate the judgment. 
Once a plaintiff files a lawsuit in federal court, the defendant has two 
188. Even worse, the plaintiff may take a chance on a jurisdictionally suspect lawsuit if he or 
she thinks it is possible to hide the jurisdictional defect from the defendant and the court. 
189. For example, in low-dollar disputes the plaintiff would probably want to avoid any 
litigation costs that are not absolutely necessary. In many such cases, it would probably be cheapest 
for the plaintiff to go ahead and file a lawsuit in federal court, and voluntarily dismiss the action 
without prejudice if a thorny (and costly) jurisdictional issue arises. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(a). 
190. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 11 cmt. d (1982). 
191. See, e.g., Builders Mut. Ins. Co. v. Dragas Mgmt., 497 F. App’x 313, 314 (4th Cir. 2012); 
Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Nat’l Mediation Bd., 479 F. App’x 657, 657 (5th Cir. 2012). 
192. E.g., United States v. Atwell, 681 F.2d 593, 594 (9th Cir. 1982). 
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basic options when considering whether to challenge federal court 
jurisdiction and, if so, when to mount that challenge. First, the defendant 
can choose to contest jurisdiction at the outset of litigation.193 The 
expected costs from contesting federal jurisdiction at the outset equal the 
sum of the defendant’s jurisdictional investigation and litigation costs,194 
expected state court costs (if the jurisdictional challenge is 
successful),195 and expected federal court costs (if the jurisdictional 
challenge is unsuccessful).196 
Most commonly, the defendant will raise jurisdictional issues up front 
when expected federal court costs significantly exceed expected state 
court costs, at which point the defendant has a clear preference for 
litigating in state court. This makes sense—the greater the defendant’s 
expected federal court costs are relative to the expected state court costs, 
the more likely the defendant will be willing to incur the expense of 
investigating and litigating jurisdiction as a means to an end.197 
Second, the defendant could adopt a wait-and-see approach, rather 
than investigating and challenging federal jurisdiction at the 
193. Most commonly, this is accomplished through a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss. See FED. 
R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1). 
194. These costs represent a certain loss for the defendant if he or she files a motion to dismiss. 
They are limited to the defendant’s own costs, however—the defendant pays neither the plaintiff’s 
costs nor the state’s costs. 
195. I am assuming that a plaintiff will re-file the case in state court following a jurisdictional 
dismissal. Thus, the defendant incurs expected state court costs when making a motion to dismiss: 
those costs equal the probability that the defendant will win the motion to dismiss, multiplied by the 
sum of defendant’s state court litigation costs and expected state court liability amount. Expressed 
formally, these expected state court costs would be (1 – pJ)(c2 + p2 (L2)), where (1 – pJ) is the 
probability that the federal court lacks jurisdiction, c2 is the defendant’s cost of litigating the merits 
in state court, p2 is the probability that the state court will issue a judgment against the defendant on 
the merits, and L2 is the state court judgment amount. 
196. Similar to expected state court costs, the defendant’s expected federal court costs equal the 
probability that the defendant will lose the motion to dismiss, multiplied by the sum of the 
defendant’s federal court litigation costs and expected federal court liability amount. Thus, the 
defendant’s expected federal court costs would be pJ (c1 + p1 (L1)), where pJ is the probability that 
the federal court has jurisdiction, c1 is the defendant’s cost of litigating the merits in federal court, p1 
is the probability that the federal court will issue a judgment against the defendant on the merits, 
and L1 is the federal court judgment amount. 
Combining these expected costs, the defendant’s total expected cost from challenging jurisdiction 
at the outset of litigation would be cJ + pJ (c1 + p1 (L1)) + (1 – pJ)(c2 + p2 (L2)) (adding the notation cJ 
to represent defendant’s cost of litigating jurisdiction). 
197. Jurisdictional litigation also is more likely if the defendant’s cost of raising jurisdictional 
issues is low, or if the odds of a dismissal are high. See Buehler, supra note 96, at 129 (noting that 
“a jurisdictional dispute occurs when a defendant’s expected benefit (namely, the probability that 
the court will dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction, multiplied by the defendant’s net benefit from 
litigating in an alternative forum) exceeds its own costs of filing and litigating a motion to 
dismiss”). 
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commencement of litigation. Under this approach, the defendant 
investigates and raises the jurisdictional defect only upon suffering an 
adverse decision on the merits in federal court.198 This strategy uses 
jurisdiction as a procedural trump card to vacate an adverse judgment—
the federal court dismisses the case, forcing the plaintiff to re-file in state 
court; the defendant then receives a second chance to prevail (often 
called “two bites at the apple”).199 
Obviously, the defendant will adopt a wait-and-see approach if the 
costs of doing so are less than the costs associated with investigating and 
raising jurisdiction at the outset.200 The defendant incurs several costs 
from a wait-and-see approach, including (1) the cost of litigating the 
merits in federal court;201 (2) the cost of investigating and litigating 
jurisdiction if the defendant loses on the merits;202 (3) expected federal 
court judgment costs (in the event that the defendant loses on the merits, 
and a subsequent jurisdictional challenge is unsuccessful);203 and (4) 
expected state court costs (in the event that the defendant loses on the 
merits, and a subsequent jurisdictional challenge is successful).204 
198. Kades, supra note 16, at 1. 
199. Id.; see also Wagman, supra note 16, at 1419. 
200. It is not unrealistic for a defendant to suspect that jurisdiction is lacking but nonetheless 
forgo jurisdictional investigation and/or litigation entirely. For example, it is not in the defendant’s 
interest to hunt for a jurisdictional defect if the combined cost of investigating and litigating 
jurisdiction exceeds the expected reduction in the defendant’s costs resulting from shifting the 
lawsuit from federal court to state court. 
201. In various formal expressions below, I use c1 to denote the defendant’s costs of litigating 
the merits in federal court. This represents a certain cost if the defendant waits to raise jurisdictional 
defects until after a decision on the merits. 
202. The defendant’s expected jurisdictional litigation costs must be multiplied by the odds that 
the plaintiff will prevail on the merits in federal court (if the defendant wins, he or she will not raise 
the jurisdictional defect). As a result, the defendant’s expected cost of litigating jurisdiction would 
be p1(cJ), where cJ represents the defendant’s costs of investigating and litigating jurisdiction in 
federal court, and p1 represents the odds that plaintiff will prevail on the merits in federal court. 
203. These costs would equal the federal court judgment amount, multiplied by both the odds 
that the defendant will lose on the merits in federal court, and the odds that the federal court will 
then conclude that it has jurisdiction over the case. In formal notation, the defendant’s expected 
federal court judgment costs would be p1(pJ)(L1), where p1 is the probability that the plaintiff will 
prevail on the merits in federal court, pJ is the probability that the federal court will conclude that it 
has jurisdiction, and L1 is the judgment that the defendant will be liable for if he or she loses on the 
merits in federal court. 
204. Modeling expected state court costs is somewhat complicated, because the defendant 
incurs these costs only if several contingencies materialize. Stated as simply as possible, the 
defendant potentially would be on the hook for (a) the defendant’s costs of litigating the merits in 
state court; and (b) the expected state court judgment amount should the defendant lose a second 
time. These costs would be multiplied by the probability that the defendant will lose on the merits in 
federal court (which would trigger a jurisdictional challenge), and the probability that the federal 
court will in turn decide that it lacks jurisdiction over the case (which would shift the lawsuit to 
 
                                                     
 
04 - Buehler_final author review.docx (Do Not Delete) 10/9/2014  4:48 PM 
686 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89:653 
With these costs in mind, the defendant has an incentive to adopt a 
wait-and-see approach when it is possible that federal jurisdiction does 
not exist, and when the outcome of the merits in both federal and state 
court is highly uncertain (i.e., the parties have roughly even odds of 
prevailing).205 If it is unclear whether the defendant has a better chance 
of prevailing in state court than federal court, there is no incentive to 
spend resources on a jurisdictional fight up front—doing so would trade 
a certain loss for no apparent gain.206 Instead, the defendant will litigate 
the merits first in federal court, gambling on the chance of a favorable 
outcome.207 If the outcome is unfavorable, the defendant can use 
jurisdiction to get a dismissal, allowing another try in state court.208 
Nonwaivable jurisdictional rules—and defendants’ perceptions about 
the relative advantages of state courts and federal courts—exacerbate 
this tendency for defendants to wait-and-see. To the extent that litigants 
view federal courts as “defendants’ courts,”209 the defendant will be 
naturally disinclined to investigate and contest jurisdiction at the start of 
federal court litigation, because doing so would potentially move the 
litigation away from a favorable forum.210 And nonwaivable 
state court). Expressed formally, the defendant’s expected state court costs would be p1 [(1 – pJ)(c2 + 
(p2 (L2)))], where p1 is the probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the merits in federal court, (1 
– pJ) is the probability that the federal court will dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction, c2 is the 
defendant’s costs of litigating the merits in state court, p2 represents the odds that the plaintiff will 
prevail on the merits in state court, and L2 represents the judgment that the defendant will be liable 
for if he or she loses on the merits in state court. 
Combining all of the costs discussed above, the defendant’s total expected cost from taking a 
wait-and-see approach to jurisdiction would be c1 + p1 [cJ + pJ (L1) + (1 – pJ)(c2 + (p2 (L2)))]. 
205. Kades, supra note 16, at 19. 
206. The desirability of a wait-and-see approach also depends in large part on the relationship 
between the cost of litigating the merits and the cost of litigating jurisdiction. An incentive to wait 
and see exists when the costs of litigating jurisdiction are high in relation to the costs of litigating 
the merits—by waiting to raise the jurisdictional issue, the defendant avoids spending money on a 
jurisdictional fight unless the defendant first loses on the merits. See Kades, supra note 16, at 18–
19. Additionally, the defendant will be more likely to adopt a wait-and-see approach if the judgment 
amount is large in relation to his or her total litigation costs. If that is the case, the defendant will 
find it worthwhile to expend a relatively small amount of resources to challenge jurisdiction and 
relitigate the merits in state court, to possibly wipe away a large unfavorable federal court judgment 
on the merits. 
207. Kades, supra note 16, at 1. 
208. Id. 
209. 20 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: 
FEDERAL PRACTICE DESKBOOK § 25, at 190 (2d ed. 2009). 
210. Of course, the defendant may have inaccurate perceptions regarding some or all of the 
variables discussed above—the cost of litigating jurisdiction, the odds that jurisdiction exists, or the 
expected judgment amount (either in federal court or state court, or both). For example, the 
defendant’s perceptions could be skewed as a result of lack of information, or optimism bias. See 
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jurisdictional rules give defendants a procedural trump card they can 
play if litigation goes sour at some point; they know courts have an 
obligation to dismiss,211 and that considerations relating to litigation 
waste or the parties’ motives are largely irrelevant.212 
c. Incentives for Plaintiffs to Belatedly Challenge Jurisdiction 
Even if the defendant wins on the merits in federal court, a 
jurisdictional defect does not necessarily fall by the wayside. Under that 
scenario, the plaintiff may have an incentive to make a belated challenge 
to the very jurisdiction that he or she invoked when filing the lawsuit. As 
a result, if a latent jurisdictional defect exists, it might not matter who 
wins in federal court—social waste probably is inevitable, thanks in 
large part to jurisdictional nonwaivability. 
A belated jurisdictional challenge occurs when the plaintiff has lost 
on the merits in federal court, and concludes that the expected benefit 
from relitigating the merits in state court213 outweighs the costs of doing 
so.214 Significantly, “sunk costs” bias—the tendency of litigants to 
“throw good money after bad” in order to recoup previous litigation 
expenditures—may make this effect even worse, causing plaintiffs to 
scuttle the jurisdictional ship in order to have another shot at winning, 
this time in state court.215 
ROBERT G. BONE, THE ECONOMICS OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 85–91 (2003) (discussing optimism bias 
and information problems in the context of settlement). This too could incentivize the defendant to 
wait and see on jurisdictional issues—the sum of inaccurately inflated or deflated values could 
convert a positive-expected-value motion to dismiss into a negative-expected-value motion to 
dismiss. 
211. See, e.g., Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583 (1999); Capron v. Van 
Noorden, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 126, 127 (1804). 
212. See, e.g., Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Global Grp., 541 U.S. 567, 575–76 (2004). 
213. Plaintiff’s expected benefit from a belated jurisdictional challenge would be the benefit 
plaintiff accrues from obtaining dismissal of the adverse federal court judgment (and the 
opportunity to relitigate the case in state court), multiplied by the odds that the plaintiff will prevail 
on a jurisdictional challenge. Thus, plaintiff’s expected benefit would be (1 – pJ)(p2 (L2) – L1) + pJ 
(L1), where pJ represents the odds that the federal court has jurisdiction, (1 – pJ) represents the odds 
that the federal court lacks jurisdiction, L1 is the amount of plaintiff’s adverse judgment in federal 
court, p2 is the probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the merits in state court, and L2 is the 
amount that plaintiff will win if he or she prevails on the merits in state court. 
214. Plaintiff’s expected costs from a belated jurisdictional challenge include the cost of 
litigating jurisdiction and the cost of relitigating the merits in state court, multiplied by the odds that 
plaintiff will prevail on the jurisdiction challenge. Expressed formally, plaintiff’s expected costs 
would be cL + cJ + (1 – pJ)(c2), where cL is plaintiff’s sunk federal court litigation costs, cJ represents 
the cost of litigating jurisdiction, (1 – pJ) represents the odds that the federal court lacks jurisdiction, 
and c2 is plaintiff’s expected state court litigation costs. 
215. See Samuel Issacharoff & George Loewenstein, Second Thoughts About Summary 
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The circumstances in which plaintiffs are most likely to raise a 
belated jurisdictional defect are fairly obvious. Several factors can 
contribute to a belated jurisdictional challenge, including a high 
probability that plaintiff will win on the jurisdictional issue, low 
jurisdictional litigation costs, and low state court litigation costs (perhaps 
because plaintiff could use much of the discovery already produced in 
federal court). Moreover, the greater plaintiff’s sunk costs are in the 
federal court lawsuit, the more likely he or she will seek dismissal of the 
federal action after suffering an adverse judgment, taking a gamble by 
relitigating in state court. The nonwaivability of jurisdictional rules 
makes this inefficient behavior possible.216 
3. Inadequate Incentives for Early Adjudication of Jurisdictional 
Issues by Federal Courts 
In theory, this divergence between private-party incentives and social 
optimality would be cured as long as federal courts actively police their 
own jurisdiction and dismiss jurisdictionally suspect lawsuits early on. 
Unfortunately, existing rules provide inadequate incentives for courts to 
do so in many cases. 
At first glance, it appears that federal court judges already have a 
powerful incentive to police their own jurisdiction—every case 
dismissed on jurisdictional grounds is one less case on the court’s 
docket.217 In other words, policing jurisdiction is a way for courts to 
reduce their caseloads and keep dockets manageable.218 There is some 
evidence that this occurs, especially in the context of pro se filings, 
where federal courts screen plaintiffs’ complaints and routinely dismiss 
suits early on jurisdictional grounds.219 
In many cases, however, courts remain passive until one of the parties 
raises a jurisdictional defect (or files some other motion, giving the court 
an opportunity to examine its jurisdiction sua sponte). For example, if 
Judgment, 100 YALE L.J. 73, 113–14 (1990) (discussing the consequences of sunk costs bias). 
216. Capron, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 126–27 (plaintiff invoked federal jurisdiction but, after 
losing on the merits, argued successfully for the first time that jurisdiction did not exist). 
217. See Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Twombly and Iqbal Reconsidered, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1621, 1633 (2012) (noting that federal court docket pressure gives those courts a significant 
incentive to dismiss lawsuits). 
218. See id. 
219. See, e.g., McKinney v. Lichenstein, No. CV 13–4403–GAF (DTB), 2013 WL 3337816, at 
*2 (C.D. Cal. June 29, 2013); Arroyo v. Massachusetts, No. CA 12–753 S., 2013 WL 3288106, at 
*3, *5 (D.R.I. June 28, 2013); Martin v. State Bar of Tex., No. 3:12–CV–5063–N–BK, 2013 WL 
3283729, at *1–2 (N.D. Tex. June 28, 2013). 
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the parties do not move for dismissal early on, the dispute will not 
command the court’s attention in any meaningful sense, and the court 
may not have a chance to think about its own jurisdiction until after the 
parties have engaged in discovery or have filed summary judgment 
motions.220 
Such is the nature of our adversarial system—until the parties present 
a dispute requiring adjudication, a judge has little incentive to invest 
time and resources on jurisdictional rulings (especially when there are 
pending motions in other cases on the court’s docket).221 The problem, 
of course, is that by the time an actual dispute arises, the parties may 
have already made a significant investment in an action that lacks 
jurisdiction, elevating the risk of litigation waste.222 
In sum, social cost from jurisdictional rules exists in large part 
because a fundamental misalignment exists between private-party 
incentives and social optimality. Under the various circumstances 
described above, jurisdictional nonwaivability incentivizes parties to file 
jurisdictionally suspect lawsuits in federal court, and to time 
jurisdictional litigation in ways that can generate significant social cost. 
Moreover, in many cases judges do not have an incentive to hunt for 
jurisdictional defects early on. 
III. A NEW APPROACH FOR SOLVING JURISDICTION’S 
SOCIAL COST 
How then do we solve jurisdiction’s social cost? In this Part, I 
propose a new way in which we can achieve equilibrium among the 
various structural and efficiency values discussed above. First, I critique 
existing proposals to curb the negative consequences of jurisdictional 
nonwaivability.223 Second, I offer a solution to jurisdiction’s social cost: 
courts must affirmatively adjudicate and resolve all jurisdictional issues 
at the outset of litigation.224 
220. See, e.g., Chambers v. Kan. City Kan. Cmty. Coll., No. 11–CV–2646–CM–DJW, 2013 
WL 3322315, at *2–3 (D. Kan. June 28, 2013) (dismissing claims on jurisdictional grounds while 
adjudicating a motion for summary judgment), vacated on other grounds, 2014 WL 326021 (D. 
Kan. Jan. 29, 2014); In re Motor Fuel Temperature Sales Practices Litig., MDL No. 1840, 2013 WL 
3283859, at *1–3 (D. Kan. June 28, 2013) (analyzing jurisdiction six years after the action was filed 
while summary judgment motions were pending). 
221. See Albert Yoon, The Importance of Litigant Wealth, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 649, 649 (2010) 
(noting that “in an adversarial system such as ours, the court’s role is constrained” and that “the 
decision of the court is based solely on the information that the litigants presented”). 
222. See supra notes 193–216 and accompanying text. 
223. See infra Part III.A. 
224. See infra Part III.B. 
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A. Critique of Existing Proposals 
In the last half-century, commentators have advanced several 
proposals for reducing the waste associated with jurisdictional 
nonwaivability.225 Many of these proposals involve a cut-off point for 
jurisdictional challenges, with limited exceptions.226 None of these 
proposals achieve optimal equilibrium among jurisdictional values, 
however. 
The American Law Institute has advanced the most significant 
proposal to date to limit the negative consequences of nonwaivable 
jurisdictional rules.227 The proposal would require parties to raise 
jurisdictional issues before the beginning of trial or, alternatively, before 
a dispositive decision on the merits (such as dismissal for failure to state 
a claim, or summary judgment).228 After that time, federal courts are 
barred from considering jurisdictional defects, unless exceptional 
circumstances exist—for example, the defect is intertwined with the 
merits; a reasonable party could not discover the defect in a timely 
manner; or there is evidence that the parties colluded to fabricate 
jurisdiction.229 Courts also could consider a defect at any time if doing 
so “is required by the Constitution.”230 The plan sought to eliminate the 
negative effects of jurisdictional nonwaivability, while preserving 
flexibility.231 
225. See ALI STUDY, supra note 18, at 64–66, 370–74; Collins, supra note 51, at 1893–96; 
Dobbs, supra note 15, at 508–10; Gao, supra note 15, at 2405. 
226. See, e.g., ALI STUDY, supra note 18, at 64–65, 371–72; Gao, supra note 15, at 2405. 
227. See ALI STUDY, supra note 18, at 64–66, 366–74; Jessica J. Berch, Waving Goodbye to 
Non-Waivability: The Case for Permitting Waiver of Statutory Subject-Matter Jurisdiction Defects, 
MCGEORGE L. REV. (forthcoming), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2314633 (advocating the 
adoption of the ALI’s proposal). 
228. ALI STUDY, supra note 18, at 64. 
229. Id. at 64–65, 371–72. The proposal also provided an exception to its cut-off rule for 
appellate review of district court jurisdictional decisions. Id. at 65; see also id. at 372. 
230. Id. at 65. Interestingly, the commentary accompanying the ALI proposal insists that a 
mandatory cut-off point for jurisdictional defects—“even issues going to the court’s power under 
Article III”—would be perfectly constitutional. Id. at 368–69; see also id. at 426–36 (providing a 
memorandum in support of the constitutionality of the ALI’s approach). The proposal’s drafters 
relied on preclusion law principles for this theory, citing cases that held res judicata precluded 
collateral attack on a prior judgment rendered without jurisdiction. See id. at 386 (citing Chicot 
Cnty. Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371 (1940); Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165 
(1938)). 
231. See ALI STUDY, supra note 18, at 367. The ALI’s stated goal was “to provide every 
incentive to both sides to seek resolution of the issue of subject-matter jurisdiction prior to the 
commencement of trial.” Id. That said, the proposal intentionally avoided a requirement that federal 
courts make a “pretrial jurisdictional determination in every case” because the ALI drafters 
reasoned that “the ordinary case does not involve any substantial question of subject-matter 
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Recently, Qian Gao used the ALI’s study as a starting point, and 
proposed linking the jurisdictional cut-off rule to the pleading stage, 
rather than trial.232 She argued the ALI’s recommendation did not 
adequately curb social waste associated with jurisdictional rules, because 
“a cutoff point at commencement of trial may give parties several years 
to prepare such a jurisdictional challenge.”233 Gao proposed an earlier 
bar, cutting off jurisdictional challenges when “the initial pleadings, 
answers, and motions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12 have 
been made.”234 After that point, a court can consider jurisdiction only if 
there is evidence of “fraud, misrepresentation, collusion, or misconduct” 
by the parties.235 
In comparison, Dan Dobbs argues that much of the social waste 
associated with jurisdictional nonwaivability can be eliminated by 
reinterpreting jurisdictional rules.236 Specifically, he contends that 
notions of jurisdictional nonwaivability arise from an overly broad 
interpretation of Supreme Court case law.237 Professor Dobbs maintains 
that these cases do not allow jurisdictional challenges at any time and for 
any reason; instead, litigants have an absolute right to raise a 
jurisdictional defect at any time only if it “appears affirmatively from the 
record.”238 Otherwise, district courts have discretion to permit tardy 
challenges to jurisdiction, but are not required to do so.239 
Finally, some advocate for incremental changes. Michael Collins 
jurisdiction and . . . such a case should not be bogged down by unnecessary procedural 
requirements.” Id. at 367–68. 
232. See Gao, supra note 15. 
233. Id. at 2397. 
234. Id. at 2405.  
235. Id. 
236. See Dobbs, supra note 15. 
237. Id. at 508; see also id. at 507 (arguing that “judicial opinions grossly exaggerate existing 
rules that permit tardy jurisdictional attacks”). 
238. Id. (quoting Mansfield, C. & L. M. Ry. Co. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379, 386 (1884)). For 
example, Professor Dobbs interprets the Supreme Court’s seminal opinion in Mansfield narrowly, 
arguing that it condones belated dismissals for lack of jurisdiction only when the jurisdictional 
allegations in the pleadings are insufficient, or when the jurisdictional defect is obvious from the 
record. See Dobbs, supra note 15, at 521. He also explains away portions of the Mansfield opinion 
that state that the parties or court can raise any jurisdictional defect at any time by noting that, 
“these passages are, on the facts, clearly dicta.” Id. at 508–09. 
239. Dobbs, supra note 15, at 510. Professor Dobbs also argues that jurisdictional statutes 
merely codified these narrow circumstances in which litigants have a right to mount a belated 
jurisdictional attack. Id. at 512–13. For example, he contends that the 1875 Judicial Act “certainly 
does not contain the remotest suggestion that the parties have standing to make a belated 
jurisdictional attack,” and does not “impose upon the judge a duty to hear or initiate such an attack.” 
Id. at 513. 
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recently argued that the history of jurisdictional nonwaivability likely 
supports a more limited approach to solving jurisdiction’s social cost.240 
He suggests that historical practices might lend support for a proposal to 
“resurrect some aspects of the older prima facie jurisdiction regime” 
used by courts in the nineteenth century.241 For example, Congress may 
be able to pass a statute giving evidentiary weight to allegations of 
jurisdictional fact in the pleadings, allowing courts to rely on that 
evidence to dismiss a belated jurisdictional attack.242 Professor Collins is 
skeptical of an across-the-board cut-off for jurisdictional objections, 
however.243 
Although these proposals are commendable, none achieves an optimal 
equilibrium of jurisdictional values. The cut-off point in the ALI 
proposal is too late; cutting off jurisdictional objections at the 
commencement of trial or a dispositive ruling on the merits allows too 
much waste—namely, the increasingly exorbitant cost of discovery in 
civil litigation.244 Although Qian Gao’s proposal cuts off jurisdictional 
objections earlier, it does not address another problem with the ALI 
plan—the unpredictability of its exceptions to the cut-off rule, which 
likely would create social cost instead of eliminating it.245 Professor 
240. See Collins, supra note 51, at 1893–96. 
241. Id. at 1893. 
242. Id. at 1893–94. In particular, Professor Collins suggests selective use of prima facie 
jurisdiction in certain categories of cases. Id. at 1896. For instance, Congress could target 
circumstances in which a party invokes jurisdiction and then attacks it after losing on the merits, or 
the defendant has knowledge of a jurisdictional defect but adopts a wait-and-see approach. Id. He 
also notes that it might make sense to soften the consequences for common jurisdictional 
mistakes—i.e., jurisdictional rules governing the citizenship of unincorporated business 
organizations in diversity cases. Id. 
243. Id. at 1895. Professor Collins notes that a sweeping cut-off rule would be similar to the old 
common-law jurisdictional pleading regime, which he argues is inferior to the modern approach 
ushered in by the 1875 Judiciary Act. Id. Although he admits that the modern approach incurs social 
waste at times, Professor Collins contends that “foreclosing objections too quickly is likely to result 
in unnecessary expenditure of federal judicial resources overall.” Id. Additionally, he rightly points 
out that ad hoc exceptions to a cut-off rule would present “usual problems of unpredictability and 
unevenness of application associated with non rule-like solutions.” Id. 
244. See, e.g., Emily C. Gainor, Note, Initial Disclosures and Discovery Reform in the Wake of 
Plausible Pleading Standards, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1441, 1441–42 (2011) (citing a case in which a 
district court ordered production of nearly 660,000 documents, constituting around eighty percent of 
the responding party’s office emails). 
245. For example, under the ALI plan, a party could make an end-run around the cut-off rule 
and belatedly challenge federal court jurisdiction if the facts underlying the jurisdictional defect 
would have eluded a party of “reasonable diligence.” ALI STUDY, supra note 18, at 64. Similarly, a 
federal court could ignore the cut-off rule if it concludes there has been “collusion or connivance” to 
hide a jurisdictional defect. Id. These terms are not always easy to define. Although Gao’s proposal 
avoids some of this uncertainty, it still includes an exception for “fraud, misrepresentation, 
collusion, or misconduct by any or all parties,” which may lead to uncertainty in practice. Gao, 
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Dobbs’s proposal also is problematic in this regard, as it would create 
costly uncertainty for litigants by giving district courts the discretion to 
permit belated jurisdictional challenges on an ad hoc basis.246 
Additionally, these proposals are not sensitive enough to the structural 
values underlying jurisdictional nonwaivability. While the ALI plan 
includes an exception to the cut-off rule that permits a belated 
jurisdictional attack “required by the Constitution,”247 it elsewhere 
echoes Professor Dobbs’s suggestion that it would be constitutional for 
Congress to foreclose jurisdictional objections that are rooted in Article 
III.248 This theory is dubious in light of Supreme Court precedent,249 and 
disregards judicial prerogatives underlying separation-of-powers values 
(specifically, the ability of the federal courts to protect the essential role 
of the judiciary).250 Moreover, by tying the cut-off for jurisdictional 
objections to the actions (or inaction) of private-party litigants, the ALI 
and Gao proposals severely limit the ability of federal courts to 
effectuate federalism and separation-of-powers values by policing their 
own jurisdiction.251 
Professor Collins’s suggestion that a prima facie jurisdiction approach 
could provide a limited, but nonetheless significant, path to curbing 
some of the socially undesirable effects of jurisdictional nonwaivability 
is intriguing, but not without its own drawbacks.252 On one hand, giving 
evidentiary significance to the jurisdictional allegations in the parties’ 
pleadings could streamline jurisdictional litigation, saving costs. On the 
other hand, Professor Collins seems to significantly underestimate the 
advantage of some kind of cut-off point to mitigate the social cost of 
jurisdiction.253 As the discussion above demonstrates, a mandatory cut-
supra note 15, at 2405. 
246. See Collins, supra note 51, at 1895 (“Discretion to allow tardy objections on an ad hoc 
basis . . . carries with it the usual problems of unpredictability and unevenness of application 
associated with non rule-like solutions.”). 
247. ALI STUDY, supra note 18, at 65. 
248. See id. at 368–69, 426–36; Dobbs, supra note 15, at 520 (“[T]here is no real question of 
constitutionality involved in foreclosing jurisdictional issues at an early stage of litigation.”). 
249. See, e.g., Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 362 (1911) (holding that Congress 
cannot expand federal court jurisdiction beyond the scope provided by Article III). 
250. See supra notes 133–136 and accompanying text. 
251. See ALI STUDY, supra note 18, at 64 (deeming jurisdictional issues barred if the parties do 
not raise those issues before “the commencement of trial on the merits” or before a 
“decision . . . that is dispositive of the merits”); Gao, supra note 15, at 2405 (tying a similar cut-off 
rule to the pleading stage). 
252. See Collins, supra note 51, at 1893–96. 
253. At one point, Professor Collins even suggests that “assigning a cut-off date for objections 
as early as the initial responsive pleading seems calculated more toward guaranteeing a lack of care 
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off point could go a long way toward realigning private-party incentives 
with the social good. 
B. A New Approach: Achieving Jurisdictional Equilibrium 
Given the shortcomings of these existing proposals, how can we 
achieve equilibrium among jurisdictional values while solving 
jurisdiction’s social cost? I advance a simple yet bold approach: we 
should frontload jurisdictional adjudication. The rules should require 
federal district courts to affirmatively certify the existence of jurisdiction 
in every case, shortly after the onset of litigation.254  After that point, 
objections to statutory federal jurisdiction will be waived.255 To 
accommodate both structural and efficiency values, appellate courts also 
should have discretion to immediately review jurisdictional orders when 
the benefits of doing so would outweigh the costs.256 Finally, courts 
should use the threat of sanctions to deter private-party abuse of 
jurisdictional rules.257 
1. Early Jurisdictional Rulings 
The best way to effectuate both structural and efficiency values is to 
ensure the early adjudication of jurisdictional issues. I argue federal 
district courts should affirmatively certify the existence of subject-matter 
jurisdiction early on in each case.258 To facilitate jurisdictional 
certification, we also should consider shifting to a fact-based 
jurisdictional pleading standard, with appropriate limitations on 
jurisdictional discovery.259 
a. Mandatory Jurisdictional Certification 
The clarity and finality of jurisdictional decisions serve both 
structural and efficiency interests. To that end, federal district courts 
should be required to issue a “jurisdictional certification” order at the 
in the invocation of jurisdiction and in the courts’ consideration of it than toward the conservation 
of any significant resources.” Id. at 1895. 
254. See infra Part III.B.1. 
255. See infra Part III.B.2. 
256. See infra Part III.B.3. 
257. See infra Part III.B.4. 
258. See infra Part III.B.1.a. 
259. See infra Part III.B.1.b. 
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close of the pleadings.260 The order would certify (and conclusively 
resolve) the existence of statutory federal subject-matter jurisdiction, and 
would include all factual findings and legal conclusions necessary to the 
jurisdictional ruling. Alternatively, the order would dismiss the case for 
lack of jurisdiction. 
Conceivably, a court would satisfy this requirement in many cases 
simply by ruling on the defendant’s Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss.261 I 
argue for a more expansive notion of jurisdictional certification, 
however: district courts should issue an explicit decision on the 
existence of subject-matter jurisdiction at an early stage in every case, as 
a matter of course. Functionally, this type of threshold determination 
would be analogous to certification of class actions under Rule 23,262 or 
the initial screening of subject-matter jurisdiction for in forma pauperis 
complaints.263 
Mandatory jurisdictional certification would further efficiency values 
for several reasons. First, it would force parties to litigate jurisdiction at 
the outset, before incurring other litigation costs.264 Second, the court’s 
affirmative obligation to rule on jurisdiction makes it less likely that 
jurisdictional defects will linger unnoticed.265 Third, issuance of a 
jurisdictional certification order serves as a “dispatch” moment for an 
interlocutory appeal of the jurisdictional issue.266 Fourth, an order that 
260. This requirement would not be novel; the federal rules already require district courts to 
issue various rulings and orders early on in civil cases, because such judicial action serves important 
interests. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 16 (requiring district courts to issue orders relating to case 
scheduling). 
261. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1). 
262. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1); Besinga v. United States, 923 F.2d 133, 135 (9th Cir. 1991) 
(using “a bright line rule requiring trial courts to certify a class in a written order which clearly sets 
out the class’s compliance with Rule 23”). Of course, my proposal differs in a significant way from 
rules governing class certification: unlike decertification of class actions under Rule 23, I would not 
allow courts to decertify jurisdiction. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1)(C). An ability by courts to do so 
would mitigate the efficiency gains from my proposal. 
263. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) (2012); see, e.g., Martin v. State Bar of Tex., No. 3:12-CV-5063-
N-BK, 2013 WL 3283729, at *1 (N.D. Tex. June 28, 2013) (“Before screening an in forma pauperis 
complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), the Court should always examine, sua sponte, if necessary, 
the threshold question of whether it has subject matter jurisdiction.”). 
264. As discussed below, the requirement of jurisdictional certification would be paired with a 
cut-off rule. See infra notes 295–311 and accompanying text. As a result, parties would know that 
they need to make jurisdictional arguments prior to certification, or lose the right to do so. 
265. Cf. Kristen M. Blankley, Did the Arbitrator “Sneeze”?—Do Federal Courts Have 
Jurisdiction Over “Interlocutory” Awards in Class Action Arbitrations?, 34 VT. L. REV. 493, 518 
(2010) (noting, in the context of federal court review of class action arbitration procedures, that “a 
large number of cases say absolutely nothing about whether jurisdiction actually exists, but instead 
simply assume jurisdiction exists in order to reach a decision on the merits”). 
266. Cf. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427, 435 (1956) (noting the district court’s 
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includes all factual findings and legal conclusions relevant to a court’s 
jurisdictional determination provides a clear rationale, reviewable on 
appeal.267 
Additionally, my proposal is sensitive to the structural values 
underlying federal jurisdiction. Jurisdiction is an expression of a court’s 
power to adjudicate,268 and judicial determination of the existence of 
jurisdiction presents an opportunity for federal courts to assert and assess 
various state, federal, legislative, and judicial prerogatives.269 Other 
proposals fail to take this into account when they tie a cut-off rule for 
jurisdictional objections to the actions of private-party litigants.270 By 
requiring the district court to issue an order on jurisdiction, a mandatory 
certification approach respects the institutional role of the federal courts. 
The parties’ desire to waive jurisdiction is not enough; the court must 
also weigh in.271 
Of course, this approach is not without potential drawbacks.272 Most 
notably, the costs of mandatory jurisdictional certification in every case 
could outweigh its benefits.273 Forcing federal courts to issue orders 
confirming jurisdiction in the vast majority of cases—when jurisdiction 
obviously exists—might be unnecessarily costly. And when cases 
present difficult jurisdictional issues, frontloading those issues will force 
litigants and courts to allocate resources to jurisdictional litigation early 
on, which could undesirably affect plaintiffs’ incentives to file suits274 
and the parties’ incentives to settle.275 Indeed, these costs would be even 
“dispatcher” role in the context of Rule 54(b), which allows district courts to certify an immediate 
appeal of a final decision on a particular claim, even though other claims in the lawsuit remain 
pending). 
267. See 1 JOSEPH M. MCLAUGHLIN, MCLAUGHLIN ON CLASS ACTIONS § 3:5 (10th ed. 2013) 
(observing that the issuance of written class certification orders under Rule 23 facilitates appellate 
review). 
268. E.g., Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs, 558 U.S. 67, 81 (2009). 
269. See supra Part II.A. 
270. See ALI STUDY, supra note 18, at 64; Gao, supra note 15, at 2405. 
271. In this sense, it would be inaccurate to view my position as an argument for “waivable 
jurisdiction” (despite my description of the current jurisdictional rules as “nonwaivable”). The 
mandatory jurisdictional certification component of my proposal ensures that jurisdiction is not 
completely waivable by the parties. 
272. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein & M. Todd Henderson, Do Accounting Rules Matter? The 
Dangerous Allure of Mark to Market, 36 J. CORP. L. 513, 518 (2011) (noting that “new rules for old 
problems may help bring on new problems”). 
273. I thank Daniel Klerman for raising and offering thoughts on this issue. 
274. See Buehler, supra note 96, at 132 (arguing that an increase in the cost and frequency of 
procedural litigation can deter some plaintiffs from filing suit). 
275. If we force plaintiffs with meritorious claims to bear the costs and risks that are associated 
with an initial round of procedural litigation, some of those plaintiffs (particularly those who are 
 
                                                     
 
04 - Buehler_final author review.docx (Do Not Delete) 10/9/2014  4:48 PM 
2014] SOLVING JURISDICTION’S SOCIAL COST 697 
more problematic in cases where jurisdictional issues are intertwined 
with the merits.276 
Such concerns are significant, but not insurmountable. In most cases, 
jurisdiction will be apparent in the pleadings, and the cost of issuing a 
terse order confirming its existence will be de minimis.277 In more 
difficult cases courts might be able to minimize costs by sequencing 
other potentially dispositive procedural issues before subject-matter 
jurisdiction.278 And if determining jurisdiction at an early stage in the 
remaining cases is still too costly, perhaps that suggests it is time for 
Congress and the federal courts to simplify jurisdictional rules279 or pare 
back the scope of jurisdictionality.280 Ultimately, even if mandatory 
jurisdictional certification incurs a marginal net loss in efficiency values, 
the corresponding gain in structural values (namely, the court’s 
consideration of separation-of-powers and federalism values in every 
case) arguably justifies that cost. 
b. Facilitating Certification: Jurisdictional Pleading and Discovery 
To facilitate jurisdictional certification, we also should consider a 
shift to fact-based jurisdictional pleading, and limits to the scope of 
risk-averse) might accept a settlement that is significantly less than the net amount they could 
receive through the litigation process. Conversely, if defendants in unmeritorious cases are forced to 
bear those costs and risks, they might be inclined to settle even though they would otherwise prevail 
on the merits. 
276. The ALI’s proposal recognized as much, creating a specific exception to its cut-off rule for 
jurisdictional issues that are “sufficiently related to the merits . . . to justify deferring the matter until 
trial.” ALI STUDY, supra note 18, at 371. 
277. For example, in a straightforward diversity case, the following language would suffice: 
“The court concludes it has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Based on the facts alleged in the 
pleadings, the court finds plaintiff is a citizen of Oregon, defendant is a citizen of California, and 
plaintiff has made good faith allegations that this action has an amount in controversy of $200,000.” 
278. See, e.g., Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malay. Int’l Shipping Co., 549 U.S. 422, 432 (2007) 
(holding that district courts have discretion to dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds before 
reaching subject-matter jurisdiction); Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 588 (1999) 
(holding that district courts have discretion to decide straightforward personal jurisdiction issues 
before deciding difficult subject-matter jurisdiction issues). See generally Scott C. Idleman, The 
Emergence of Jurisdictional Resequencing in the Federal Courts, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (2001). 
279. See, e.g., Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Global Grp., 541 U.S. 567, 582 (2004) (“Uncertainty 
regarding the question of jurisdiction is particularly undesirable, and collateral litigation on the 
point particularly wasteful.”). 
280. See Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 516 (2006) (suggesting courts should presume 
that a statutory limitation is nonjurisdictional unless Congress clearly indicates otherwise); Howard 
Wasserman, Jurisdiction, Merits, and Procedure, 102 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 215, 216 (2008) 
(arguing that “courts should consider a provision of positive law as jurisdictional only when its plain 
language is addressed to the court and speaks in terms of judicial power about the class of cases that 
courts can hear and resolve”). 
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jurisdictional discovery. 
First, early jurisdictional adjudication gives the contents of the 
pleadings added importance.281 To ensure the parties’ pleadings contain 
adequate information to form the basis of a jurisdictional certification 
order, we may need to amend or reinterpret rules to require heightened 
pleading of jurisdictional facts.282 Existing rules require minimal factual 
detail for jurisdictional allegations,283 and it is customary for complaints 
to offer no more than a cursory sentence or two on jurisdiction.284 
A fact-based jurisdictional pleading standard—which would require 
plaintiffs to allege both the basis for jurisdiction and the facts supporting 
that basis—would root out vague and unhelpful averments.285 It would 
force parties to think through and support jurisdictional allegations 
before filing suit and, more importantly, before incurring litigation 
costs.286 And a fact-based jurisdictional pleading approach would give 
both the defendant and the court a more complete and adequate 
understanding of the jurisdictional basis of the lawsuit, allowing early 
adjudication.287 
281. See Edward H. Cooper, Simplified Rules of Civil Procedure?, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1794, 
1812–13 (2002) (“It is important to establish the basic framework of the pleadings as early as 
possible so that other pretrial activities can proceed.”). 
282. After the Supreme Court’s decisions in Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), 
and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), reinterpreted the Rule 8(a)(2) pleading standards for 
stating a claim for relief, it is somewhat unclear whether the federal rules require factual plausibility 
for jurisdictional allegations under Rule 8(a)(1). Compare Heirs of Deskins v. Consol. Energy, Inc., 
No. 1:11CV00069, 2012 WL 503636, at *2 (W.D. Va. Feb. 12, 2012) (suggesting that Twombly 
does not apply to jurisdictional averments), with Coal. for a Sustainable Delta v. Fed. Emergency 
Mgmt. Agency, 711 F. Supp. 2d 1152, 1158–59 (E.D. Cal. 2010) (holding that Twombly applies to 
jurisdictional facts). My argument for a fact-based approach to jurisdictional pleading assumes that 
Twombly and Iqbal do not already require something akin to fact-based pleading for jurisdictional 
allegations, which is a question for another day. 
283. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(1) (merely requiring “a short and plain statement of the grounds 
for the court’s jurisdiction”). 
284. This is not surprising, considering the paucity of factual detail included in Form 7 of the 
federal rules, which gives examples of jurisdictional allegations that would be sufficient at the 
pleading stage. See FED. R. CIV. P. Form 7. 
285. This heightened standard would be similar to the fact-pleading approach that some state 
courts use to assess whether plaintiff has stated a claim for relief. See, e.g., Harvey v. Eastman 
Kodak Co., 610 S.W.2d 582, 584 (Ark. 1981) (adhering to a fact-pleading approach, rather than a 
notice-pleading approach); Teter v. Clemens, 492 N.E.2d 1340, 1342 (Ill. 1986) (same). 
286. As a result, mistaken invocation of federal court jurisdiction would be less likely. It also 
would be difficult for parties to use conclusory allegations to intentionally hide potential 
jurisdictional defects. Equally important, the defendant would be in a better position to make an 
accurate assessment of the costs and benefits of making a motion to dismiss on jurisdictional 
grounds. 
287. I am not arguing that we turn back the clock to the days of common law pleading, when 
courts dismissed claims with prejudice if litigants did not adhere to hyper-technical procedural 
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Admittedly, fact-based pleading has potential disadvantages. 
Ferretting out jurisdictional facts in the early stages of litigation is not 
costless, and it is possible that defendants may use heightened pleading 
rules in strategic ways that incur social costs.288 In the vast majority of 
cases, however, the jurisdictional facts will consist of fairly 
straightforward information that is not costly to gather.289 And in cases 
that present more jurisdictional complexity, the costs imposed by a fact-
based pleading standard will appropriately cause the plaintiff to think 
through these issues before filing suit. 
Second, efficiencies gained through early jurisdictional rulings will 
mean little unless we also address the social cost arising from 
jurisdictional discovery.290 It is increasingly common for parties to 
engage in a labor-intensive, costly round of discovery early in the 
litigation process, prior to the court’s decision on a motion to dismiss.291 
To make matters worse, there is a dearth of case law in this area, and the 
standards governing the scope of jurisdictional discovery are vague and 
uncertain.292 
Rule makers and courts should consider revising the standards for 
jurisdictional proof to streamline the process and minimize the need for 
discovery prior to adjudication of jurisdictional issues. Perhaps courts 
could operate on the assumption that facts alleged in the pleadings are 
sufficient for jurisdictional adjudication.293 In the event that more detail 
formalities. See FREER, supra note 157, at 290. Instead, the jurisdictional fact-pleading standard I 
envision would require a minimal level of factual heft, so parties and courts can accurately assess 
subject-matter jurisdiction at an early stage. 
288. For example, the defendant might strategically seek dismissal based on sparse 
jurisdictional allegations in the complaint, even when jurisdiction likely exists. See Emil Petrossian, 
In Pursuit of the Perfect Forum: Transnational Forum Shopping in the United States and England, 
40 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1257, 1309 (2007) (noting that well-financed defendants frequently initiate 
costly procedural litigation “to dry out the plaintiff’s resources”). 
289. See, e.g., United Phosphorus, Ltd. v. Angus Chem. Co., 322 F.3d 942, 957 (7th Cir. 2003) 
(Wood, J., dissenting) (“Inquiries into diversity jurisdiction are often . . . straight forward, even 
though fact-finding might be necessary in the occasional case . . . .”). 
290. The federal rules do not explicitly authorize discovery of jurisdictional facts. That has not 
stopped courts from authorizing jurisdictional discovery, however. See S.I. Strong, Jurisdictional 
Discovery in United States Federal Courts, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 489, 497–501 (2010). 
291. Id. at 536. 
292. Id. at 492–93. 
293. This is not unheard of. During much of the nineteenth century, federal courts heavily relied 
on the pleadings to determine the existence of jurisdiction. Collins, supra note 51, at 1838–40. 
“Prima facie” diversity jurisdiction existed if the plaintiff’s complaint alleged that the parties were 
citizens of different states, and such allegations were sufficient for federal courts to adjudicate the 
merits, even when there was no jurisdiction in fact. Id. at 1837–39. 
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is necessary, parties could use affidavits to present additional facts.294 
But courts should refuse to allow jurisdictional discovery unless the need 
for that discovery clearly outweighs its costs. 
In other words, I argue that courts should reverse the existing 
presumption behind jurisdictional discovery: instead of starting from the 
assumption that discovery is appropriate, courts should assume that the 
pleadings and affidavits are sufficient to adjudicate the jurisdictional 
issue, and should order discovery only when it is absolutely necessary. 
Jurisdictional discovery likely would be rare under this approach, further 
reducing litigation costs. 
2. Foreclosing Jurisdictional Challenges 
Mandatory foreclosure of jurisdictional challenges after a specified 
cut-off point should be a cornerstone of any proposal to solve 
jurisdiction’s social cost. I argue that challenges to statutory jurisdiction 
should be cut off at the close of the pleadings.295 After that point, courts 
could consider belatedly raised jurisdictional defects only if they 
implicate constitutional concerns.296 
a. Cutting off Objections to Statutory Jurisdiction 
Much of the social cost of jurisdictional nonwaivability would be 
mitigated if objections to statutory federal court jurisdiction were cut off 
early on—ideally, at the close of the pleadings, when the district court 
issues its jurisdictional certification order.297 This approach would 
provide incentives for the defendant to either make a motion to dismiss, 
or identify jurisdictional defects in her answer to the complaint.298 
The main advantage to implementing this mandatory cut-off is that it 
provides incentives for parties to investigate jurisdiction and litigate 
jurisdictional defects early, before incurring other litigation costs. 
Notably, it would eliminate incentives for the defendant to adopt a wait-
and-see approach, raising jurisdictional defects only after suffering an 
294. Most relevant jurisdictional facts—such as the citizenship of the parties, the amount in 
controversy, and federal law issues arising from the plaintiff’s claims—can be adduced from 
pleadings with sufficient factual detail. In the unlikely event that more detail is needed, it would be 
easy in most cases for the parties to attach affidavits or statements of jurisdictional fact to their 
pleadings or to briefing submitted in advance of jurisdictional certification. 
295. See infra Part III.2.a. 
296. See infra Part III.2.b. 
297. See Gao, supra note 15, at 2404–07. 
298. See id. at 2405–06. 
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adverse judgment on the merits.299 It also would prevent the plaintiff 
from mounting a belated challenge to the very jurisdiction that he or she 
invoked when initially filing the lawsuit in federal court.300 
The primary criticism against this type of mandatory cut-off—
particularly one that applies early in litigation—stems once again from 
concerns relating to litigation costs.301 The argument goes like this: cases 
with latent jurisdictional defects are fairly rare, and the cost savings from 
an early cut-off of jurisdictional objections in those few cases would be 
greatly outweighed by the expense of parties investigating jurisdiction in 
all cases—especially cases in which jurisdictional litigation would not 
otherwise occur. 
And yet, the federal court system already imposes other similar 
threshold procedural requirements as a matter of course. For example, 
Rule 26(a)(1) requires litigants in most civil actions to make initial 
disclosures of essential factual information to the other side shortly after 
the onset of litigation.302 Similarly, Rule 11 requires the parties and their 
counsel to perform a reasonable inquiry into the factual allegations in the 
pleadings.303 Even in the jurisdictional context, existing doctrine 
prohibits litigants from collaterally attacking jurisdiction after a final 
judgment.304 We adhere to these rules—despite their short-term cost—
because they promote efficiency and just outcomes over the long-term. I 
submit that an initial investment in jurisdictional matters by civil 
litigants is no different. 
Indeed, I am not entirely sure what types of complexity and costs the 
doubters of a cut-off rule fear. Jurisdiction will almost certainly be easily 
investigated and easily alleged in the vast majority of federal court cases, 
at minimal cost to the parties. Most federal question complaints will 
simply list an applicable federal law cause of action.305 Likewise, most 
diversity pleadings will simply list the citizenship of parties who are 
299. See supra notes 193–212 and accompanying text. 
300. See supra notes 213–18 and accompanying text. 
301. Collins, supra note 51, at 1895 (arguing that a jurisdictional cut-off rule would “result in 
unnecessary expenditure of federal judicial resources overall”). 
302. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1). See generally Gainor, supra note 244, at 1452–58. 
303. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b). See generally Jerold S. Solovy et al., Sanctions Under Rule 11: A 
Cross-Circuit Comparison, 37 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 727, 727–45 (2004) (analyzing the circumstances 
in which Rule 11 is used by courts to sanction improper pleading practices). 
304. See, e.g., Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106, 111–14 (1963); Chicot Cnty. Drainage Dist. v. 
Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371, 375–76 (1940). 
305. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2012); Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 
545 U.S. 308, 312 (2005) (noting that “federal-question jurisdiction is invoked by and large by 
plaintiffs pleading a cause of action created by federal law”). 
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without a doubt completely diverse, along with an amount in 
controversy that is sufficient under plaintiff-friendly rules.306 If 
statements alleging subject-matter jurisdiction are more complex than 
that, the parties and court probably ought to be thinking about 
jurisdiction up front anyway. 
b. Using Article III as a Jurisdictional Backstop 
Note that I am advocating an early cut-off point for challenges to 
statutory jurisdiction only. Because federal courts probably have an 
obligation to assess the constitutional basis for subject-matter 
jurisdiction at any point,307 they should be able to consider belated 
arguments about Article III jurisdiction. Thus, even after litigation on 
statutory jurisdiction is cut off, Article III provides a “jurisdictional 
backstop,” ensuring that federal courts can assert and assess essential 
structural values if need be. 
Under my proposal, jurisdictional litigation after the cut-off point 
presumably would be greatly reduced from status quo levels. At the 
close of the pleadings, the parties will have raised or waived arguments 
that would be based on the often confusing intricacies of statutory 
subject-matter jurisdiction.308 Many latent issues as to the court’s 
constitutional jurisdiction will be relatively tame by comparison—i.e., 
whether there is a “federal ingredient” in federal question cases,309 or 
whether the parties are minimally diverse in diversity cases.310 The outer 
boundaries of Article III jurisdiction likely will be litigated less 
frequently—and more predictably—than the contours of statutory 
306. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2012); Mas v. Perry, 489 F.2d 1396, 1400 (5th Cir. 1974) (“It must 
appear to a legal certainty that the claim is really for less than the jurisdictional amount to justify 
dismissal.”). 
307. See supra note 158. 
308. See, e.g., Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 89 (2010) (noting that the legal test for a 
corporation’s “principal place of business” for statutory diversity jurisdiction has been “difficult to 
apply”); Grable, 545 U.S. at 314–16 (stating and applying the multiple-factor test for statutory 
federal question jurisdiction). 
309. See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 471 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., 
dissenting) (noting that Congress can grant jurisdiction “whenever there exists in the background 
some federal proposition that might be challenged, despite the remoteness of the likelihood of actual 
presentation of such a federal question”); Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 
738, 824–25 (1824) (upholding the constitutionality of a court’s exercise of federal question 
jurisdiction under Article III because the federal question “forms an original ingredient” of the 
lawsuit). 
310. See State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 530–31 (1967) (noting that 
Article III merely requires “minimal diversity,” which exists “so long as any two adverse parties are 
not co-citizens”). 
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jurisdiction,311 reducing social costs associated with the jurisdictional 
inquiry. 
Undoubtedly, some thorny Article III jurisdictional issues will 
persist.312 For example, a cut-off point for statutory jurisdictional 
requirements does little to curb the costs of belated litigation on 
standing, ripeness, or mootness, which are rooted in constitutional 
limitations on federal jurisdiction,313 and can involve elaborate and 
complex jurisdictional determinations.314 
But we should not let the perfect be the enemy of the good.315 
Mandatory jurisdictional certification, paired with an early cut-off rule 
for statutory jurisdictional challenges, likely will address most of the 
social waste at play.316 Additionally, constitutional limits on jurisdiction 
arguably protect vital structural interests,317 making it somewhat easier 
to justify the social cost of dismissals based on latent jurisdictional 
defects. Thus, even if a cut-off for challenges to statutory jurisdiction 
will not solve all problems associated with jurisdictional nonwaivability, 
it is a step in the right direction. 
3. Interlocutory Appeal of Jurisdictional Rulings 
In addition to jurisdictional certification and a cut-off point, one of the 
most significant ways to reduce jurisdiction’s social cost would be to 
311. Granted, the boundaries of Article III jurisdiction are not always clear, and are sometimes 
quite murky, due in no small part to the Supreme Court’s efforts to sidestep questions of 
constitutional jurisdiction in the past. FALLON ET AL., supra note 147, at 763–73 (analyzing nuances 
in constitutional federal question jurisdiction). Even so, my proposal would at least give federal 
courts greater opportunity to clarify these boundaries. 
312. I thank Kathryn Watts for raising and offering thoughts on this issue. 
313. See DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 352 (2006). 
314. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Marbury v. Madison as the First Great Administrative Law 
Decision, 37 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 481, 484 (2004) (describing standing, ripeness, and mootness as 
“a maze of complicated and partially overlapping doctrines”). 
315. M. de Voltaire, La Begueule, Conte Moral, in CONTES ET POÉSIES DIVERSES A3 (1772) 
(stating “le mieux est l’ennemi du bien”; translated, “the best is the enemy of the good”). 
316. It appears that statutory federal question and diversity jurisdiction issues come up much 
more often than constitutional standing, mootness, and ripeness questions. A Westlaw search for all 
federal cases decided during June 2013 in which the word “jurisdiction” appears within 200 words 
of “federal question” or “diversity” yielded 800 results. In comparison, a similar search for June 
2013 cases in which the word “jurisdiction” appears within 200 words of “standing,” “mootness,” or 
“ripeness” produced 350 results. 
317. See, e.g., A. Christopher Bryant, Presidential Signing Statements and Congressional 
Oversight, 16 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 169, 180 (2007) (suggesting, in the context of presidential 
signing statements, that Article III justiciability doctrines “protect core structural values by 
circumscribing the role of the judiciary in . . . highly politicized and policy-sensitive 
disagreements”). 
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allow interlocutory appeals of jurisdictional decisions at the discretion of 
the federal appellate courts.318 This flies in the face of current practice—
currently, rulings on jurisdictional issues are not immediately 
appealable, and normally are appealed only after the trial court issues a 
final judgment.319 The final judgment rule arises from a desire to prevent 
wasteful piecemeal appeals.320 
A limited ability by appellate courts to grant discretionary review of 
interlocutory jurisdictional rulings at an early stage of litigation could 
obviate significant waste in many cases.321 This would be especially true 
when the jurisdictional issue is novel or uncertain, or when it is probable 
that the trial court’s jurisdictional ruling is erroneous.322 These 
circumstances make it more likely that the jurisdictional ruling 
eventually would be reversed on appeal, after the parties spend 
significant resources litigating the merits.323 Interlocutory review of 
jurisdictional rulings would be appropriate at that point, and would 
likely decrease overall social costs—in particular, wasted litigation 
resources—while respecting structural values.324 
Fortunately, an analogous model for this type of discretionary 
appellate review already exists: under Rule 23(f), federal appellate 
318. See Collins, supra note 51, at 1895 n.274 (noting that existing proposals for jurisdictional 
cut-off rules fail to address the significant costs of “eleventh-hour jurisdictional reversals” on 
appeal). 
319. See, e.g., Khadr v. United States, 529 F.3d 1112, 1117–18 (D.C. Cir. 2008); Eastman v. 
Marine Mech. Corp., 438 F.3d 544, 549 (6th Cir. 2006). 
320. Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 106 (2009). 
321. Congress has recognized the efficiency benefit of interlocutory review in similar contexts. 
See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (2012) (allowing appellate courts to hear discretionary appeals of 
“order[s] involv[ing] a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for 
difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the 
ultimate termination of the litigation”); see also S. REP. NO. 85-2434, at 2 (1958), reprinted in 1958 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5255, 5256 (citing “the need for expedition of cases pending before the district 
courts” as the reason for § 1292(b)). 
322. Indeed, if the jurisdictional issue is novel or uncertain, the district court and court of 
appeals likely could exercise their discretion and allow immediate appeal of the jurisdictional order 
under § 1292(b), meaning my proposal could be partially accomplished using existing jurisdictional 
statutes. 
323. See, e.g., Michael E. Solimine, Revitalizing Interlocutory Appeals in the Federal Courts, 
58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1165, 1177–78 (1990) (noting that decisions on uncertain law are more 
likely to be reversed by appellate courts). 
324. Specifically, discretionary interlocutory review would serve as something akin to a 
litigation pressure-release valve—if the appellate courts notice a novel or uncertain jurisdictional 
issue, they could resolve that issue early on, allowing the parties to proceed with litigation with the 
certainty that jurisdiction exists (or re-file in state court if it does not). And there would be no 
structural concerns if the interlocutory review mechanism is statutory, because Congress will have 
given its consent. 
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courts have discretion to permit an immediate interlocutory appeal of 
“an order granting or denying class-action certification.”325 The rule 
does not facilitate undue delay,326 and interlocutory appeals on class 
action certification rulings are far from common.327 
Similarly, Congress or rule makers could give federal courts 
discretionary authority to exercise immediate appellate review of 
jurisdictional rulings when the benefits of interlocutory review outweigh 
the costs of further jurisdictional litigation. The relevant statutes and 
rules could codify factors that appellate courts must consider when 
deciding whether to grant immediate review—i.e., the jurisdictional 
issue is novel, and delaying appellate review would cause the parties and 
courts to incur unnecessary costs. 
Let me be clear: I do not advocate mandatory appellate review of 
interlocutory jurisdictional rulings, nor do I think it would be wise to 
have widespread use of a discretionary appellate review mechanism. 
Interlocutory appeal of jurisdictional rulings should be fairly rare, and 
strictly limited to cases in which there is good reason to think that 
immediate intervention by appellate courts would prevent social waste. 
4. Using Sanctions to Deter Abuse by Litigants 
Finally, some might argue that the proposed approach I outline here 
would strip a federal court of its discretionary ability to dismiss a case 
when it belatedly discovers that jurisdiction was fabricated or 
manufactured through “fraud, misrepresentation, collusion, or 
misconduct by any or all parties.”328 The thrust of this critique is that 
clear jurisdictional rules lack nuance that would allow courts to check 
against abuse by litigants.329 
I do not dispute the importance of this point. Instead, I argue that 
325. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f). See generally Linda S. Mullenix, Some Joy in Whoville: Rule 23(f), 
A Good Rulemaking, 69 TENN. L. REV. 97 (2001); Michael E. Solimine & Christine Oliver Hines, 
Deciding to Decide: Class Action Certification and Interlocutory Review by the United States 
Courts of Appeals Under Rule 23(f), 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1531 (2000). Other similar analogs 
also exist in limited niches of federal jurisdictional law. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1453(c)(1) (2012) 
(giving appellate courts discretion to hear an appeal from a remand order). 
326. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f) (“An appeal does not stay proceedings in the district court unless 
the district judge or the court of appeals so orders.”). 
327. See 2 MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 282, § 7:2 (noting that federal courts have emphasized 
that “appellate review of class certification decisions should not be routine”). 
328. Gao, supra note 15, at 2405. 
329. See, e.g., ALI STUDY, supra note 18, at 372 (justifying the nuance of the exceptions to its 
jurisdictional cut-off approach in part because “federal courts should remain free at all times to 
reject improper efforts to impose jurisdiction by consent”). 
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abuse can be discouraged through other means. Most notably, courts 
could use the threat of ex post sanctions for collusion and connivance to 
incentivize proper litigant behavior ex ante.330 As long as sanctions are 
severe enough to deter wrongful conduct, litigants presumably will 
behave.331 
The key point is that courts must set the expected sanction amount so 
that it exceeds the litigants’ expected benefit from manufacturing 
jurisdiction or colluding to hide a jurisdictional defect.332 Suppose, for 
example, that plaintiff and defendant’s collective net benefit from hiding 
a jurisdictional defect (and litigating in federal court instead of state 
court) is $50,000.333 Suppose also that there is only a ten percent chance 
that the federal court will discover the defect and the parties’ collusion. 
If that is the case, the magnitude of the sanction must be set in excess of 
$500,000, so that the parties will be properly deterred. For example, if 
the court sets the magnitude of the sanction at $500,001, then the 
expected sanction (after multiplying the sanction magnitude by a ten 
percent probability of enforcement) will be $50,000.10. Theoretically, 
that amount will be enough to deter parties who would otherwise receive 
$50,000 collectively if they colluded to manufacture jurisdiction. 
Proper use of sanctions would render discretionary exceptions for 
collusion or other litigant misbehavior unnecessary. This in turn would 
enhance the clarity and predictability of jurisdictional rules—Congress 
or rule makers could adopt a strict, mandatory jurisdictional cut-off rule, 
while using sanctions to guard against litigant misbehavior. 
330. E.g., Roger C. Cramton, Delivery of Legal Services to Ordinary Americans, 44 CASE W. 
RES. L. REV. 531, 619 (1994) (“The development of judicially-imposed sanctions in litigated 
proceedings . . . has had beneficial effects on litigative behavior: discouragement of frivolous 
assertions and deterrence of tactical litigation abuses.”). 
331. A complete analysis of the desirability and workability of sanctions in the context of 
jurisdictional allegations is beyond the scope of this Article. My point here is more general: there 
are other methods—including sanctions—that Congress, rule makers, and courts can use to deter 
litigant abuse. 
332. Additionally, a court may need to use nonmonetary sanctions—such as its power to hold 
litigants in contempt—when a litigant’s expected benefit from manufacturing jurisdiction exceeds 
its assets. See SHAVELL, supra note 172, at 230–31 (noting that judgment-proof individuals view 
losses exceeding their assets as merely equaling their assets, and are inadequately deterred).  
333. There are several scenarios in which a federal forum would be mutually preferable to both 
plaintiff and defendant. Perhaps the plaintiff has greater faith that federal courts will enforce federal 
law claims. Perhaps the defendant simultaneously believes that a federal court jury will be more 
defendant-friendly than a state court jury. 
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CONCLUSION 
Federal court subject-matter jurisdiction rules create significant social 
cost. They inflate litigation expenses, increase jurisdictional litigation, 
and make it more likely that litigants will play games with the rules for 
their own advantage. In light of this social cost, it is quite remarkable 
that litigants, scholars, and judges are so willing to accept the 
disadvantages of nonwaivable jurisdictional rules, without arguing more 
forcefully for change. 
Change starts with a new mindset, and a new approach to our 
jurisdictional rules. We must view the structural and efficiency values 
underlying jurisdictional nonwaivability for what they are: multipolar, 
pluralistic, incommensurable, and at times conflicting. Rather than 
framing these values in a traditional, monistic way, we should seek 
solutions that identify and accommodate all relevant value sets, and 
achieve equilibrium among the various interests at play. Of course, those 
interests are, as always, more complicated than they first appear. 
Solving the social cost of jurisdiction will not be easy. And yet, it 
remains a noble goal. Adoption of the proposals outlined in this 
Article—mandatory jurisdictional certification, a cut-off point for 
jurisdictional objections, an opportunity for interlocutory appeal of 
jurisdictional rulings, and sanctions to deter litigant abuse—would go a 
long way toward achieving equilibrium among structural and efficiency 
values. And even if some or all of these ideas do not come to fruition, 
perhaps they will at least provoke a meaningful debate on jurisdictional 
values, and our nonwaivable jurisdictional rules. 
 
 
